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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law-Administrative Procedure Act as Means for Pro-
duction and Inspection of Papers.-Defendant was indicted on two counts
of willful tax evasion' for the years 1954 and 1955. Defendant moved, pur-
suant to Rules 16 and 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 2
for production, discovery and inspection, prior to trial, of certain papers and
statements which had been obtained by the Internal Revenue Service prior
to defendant's indictment. These materials had originally been taken in con-
nection with the prosecution of defendant's husband for income tax evasion,
which had resulted in mistrial three months previous to defendant's indict-
ment. Defendant's motion was based upon the necessity of obtaining the
material in order to prepare an adequate defense. The motion was sustained
and the Government ordered to produce and permit defendant to inspect and
copy all statements and documents obtained from defendant by the Internal
Revenue Service. United States v. Fandhcr, 195 F. Supp. 448 (D. Conn. 1961).
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits discovery where
a defendant makes a reasonable request for inspection of documents and tangible
objects, material to his defense, and obtained from defendant or from others by
seizure or process.3 The majority of federal courts have refused to allow discovery
and inspection of defendant's own statements:1 The majority rule has been
criticized by those who see in pre-trial discovery a means of preventing sur-
prise and promoting fair trialU Rule 17(c) provides a pre-trial opportunity to
subpoena material for inspection, which it is anticipated will be used at the
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 145(b), 53 Stat. 62; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201.
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, 17(c).
3. Rule 16 provides: "Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or
tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others
by seizure or by process, upon a shov.ing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable."
4. Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Shores v. United States, 174
F.2d 3S (Sth Cir. 1949); United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United
States v. Gim Hall, 1S F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 245 F.2d 335
(2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Peltz, 1S F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v.
Pete, 111 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1953); United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696 (W.D.
La. 1949); United States v. Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (D. Mass. 1947); United States v.
Black, 6 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ind. 1946). The words of rule 16, "obtained from," have been
construed to apply to those documents and objects which were in existence and in the
custody of a defendant prior to the government's procurement of them. See United States
v. Black, supra, at 271. Thus, under this section, courts have denied discovery of statements
or confessions, either written or oral, given by the defendant to a government agency.
S. See United States v. Singer, 19 F.R.D. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Peace,
16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 371 (D.D.C.
1954). These courts have expressed the view that discovery should be permitted -ince
there was no dear expression of an intent in the rule to exclude such confe:izons or state-
ments.
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trial.8 Rule 17(c) therefore, is not properly a vehicle for discovery but rather
for production and inspection.7 The introduction, in 1945, of rules 16 and
17(c) provided the federal courts for the first time with specific authority to
grant pre-trial inspection.8 The use of the words "may order," in rule 16 and
"may command" in rule 17(c), rather than "shall order" or "shall command,"
was construed to give the courts discretionary power to deny inspection on
grounds not specified in the rules.9 Consequently rules 16 and 17(c) both
empower, but do not require, the courts to permit inspection. The discretionary
nature of the procedure has resulted in serious conflict and divergent schools
of thought regarding application of the rules. The Supreme Court had stated that
the words of rules 16 and 17(c) were to be given their ordinary meaning to
carry out the purpose of establishing a more liberal policy for production,
inspection and use of materials at trial, in order to enable the accused to meet
the charges presented against him.'0 The scope and purpose of the rules, how-
ever, have been narrowed in contravention of the clear direction of the
Supreme Court, by the exercise of the lower courts' broad discretionary
powers in the matter." Some of these decisions have restricted the Supreme
Court's rule by requiring, although the Court did not say so, certain definite con-
ditions to be met by the defendant before inspection would be ordered.
6. United States v. Carter, supra note 5, at 369; United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk
Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509 (D.D.C. 1949). The chief innovation of rule 17(c) was
to expedite trial by providing a time and place before trial for inspection of the sub-
poenaed materials.
7. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951). The Supreme Court
stated: "It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of discovery, and then by
Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in the broadest terms." Id. at 220. Rule 17(c) is not
authority for a fishing expedition. Id. at 221. Rule 17(c) provides: "A subpoena may
also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents
or other objects designated therein . . . . The court may direct that books, papers, docu-
ments or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior
to trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their
production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be in-
spected by the parties and their attorneys." Rule 17(c) is a method of inspection of evi-
dentiary material obtained by the Government by means other than seizure or process.
Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, supra. "Evidentiary" has been construed to mean ad-
missible in evidence. United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
8. See Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in
the Federal Courts, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 1113 (1957).
9. United States v. Giramonti, 26 F.R.D. 168 (D. Conn. 1960); United States v. Bren-
nan, 134 F. Supp. 42 (D. Minn. 1955); United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
10. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951). See also United
States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1956).
11. United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (motion to inspect an oral
statement given by the defendant and reduced to writing by the government, denied as
not being within the scope of the rule). See also State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881
(1953) (construing a similar state rule).
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Judge Weinfeld, in United States v. Peace,' interpreted the rules to require
a showing of "good cause" before the discretionary power of the court
would be exercised in favor of inspection, i.e., the defendant must es-
tablish that the documents or statements are evidentiary and relevant, and can-
not be otherwise procured reasonably in advance of trial, that defendant can-
not properly prepare for trial without such production and discovery, and that
the application is made in good faith.13
Jurisdictions favoring a strict construction of the rules maintain that the
Government should not be required to disclose its case to the defendant before
trial, and that production and inspection of the requested documents would
inevitably lead to alteration of his defense so as to conform to the material in
those documents.' 4 Those advocating a more liberal interpretation have argued
that because of the seriousness of a criminal charge and its correiponding
penalties, the defendant should not be denied any source of material beneficial
to his defense.15 Under the latter view it is argued that those who interpret
the rules as an invitation to perjury, in effect, strip the defendant of the pre-
sumption of innocence and disregard the sanctions for perjury.'0 This con-
fusion and the resulting lack of predictability have pointed out the unfairness
to a defendant whose motion under rules 16 and 17(c) is to be determined ac-
cording to the particular "school" which the presiding judge happens to follow.
Since under the rules there is no objective basis upon which a motion for in-
spection may be determined, the defendant has no means of ascertaining the
disposition of his motion, and no objective guide upon which to make his mo-
tion.
Judge Timbers, in the instant case,' 7 here noted that aside from rules 16
and 17(c) there existed an entirely different basis for granting discovery of a
statement taken by the Internal Revenue Service-Section 1005(b) of the
Administrative Procedure Act.' s This section provides in relevant part: "Every
person compelled to submit data or evidence [in a proceeding conducted by
an administrative agency] shall be entitled to ... procure a copy or transcript
thereof .... ." From a defendant's standpoint, the mode of discovery provided
12. 16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
13. Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953); United States v. Duncan,
22 F.R.D. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 195); United States v. INmkler, 17 F.R.D. 213 (D.RJ. 1955);
United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 33S (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
14. See, eg., United States v. Malizia, 154 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States
v. Palermo, 21 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C.
1954).
15. See cases cited in note 5 supra.
16. United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
17. 195 F. Supp. at 457.
18. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(b) (1953). Only in certain instances does
due process require pre-trial production and inspection of defendant's statements. See
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790D, S01 (1952); Application of Tune, 230 F.2d M, S90
(3d Cir. 1956).
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under this act is more effective than rules 16 and 17(c) because it is manda-
tory.' 9
There has been no reported decision concerning the applicability of section
1005(b) to investigations of the Internal Revenue Service. Other provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, however, have been held applicable to an
income tax investigation by the Internal Revenue Service,2 0 e.g., a witness's
right under the act to be accompanied by counsel.2 ' However, in a recent un-
reported decision,22 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied defendant's motion, made under this section, for pre-trial discovery
of statements made before the Internal Revenue Service. In so ruling the
court relied on cases2 3 which denied inspection of statements made before
other administrative agencies; but these cases clearly illustrate the exceptions
specifically provided in the act itself. Section 7(a) provides that judicial re-
view procedures are not operative where statutes otherwise preclude judicial
review,24 or where agency action is by law committed to agency discre-
19. The use of the word "shall" in the act eliminates the possibility of the exercise
of discretion by the presiding judge in entertaining a motion under the act.
20. United States v. Smith, 87 F. Supp. 293 (D. Conn. 1949). The witnesses sub-
poenaed appeared but declined to testify before the agent unless their attorney was
permitted to be present. The Government claimed that the proceeding was investigatory,
and because of its nature demanded secrecy. The court held that the Administrative
Procedure Act was intended to establish uniform standards of fairness for dealings of
administrative bodies with the citizen. The witnesses had the right to presence and advice
of counsel, and the court issued an order enforcing the subpoena, and permitting the
presence of outside counsel for the witness. See Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141
(5th Cir. 1960). In Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952), the court
denied the witness the right to presence and advice of counsel and also denied the right
of the witness to be accompanied by a personal stenographer on the grounds that the
Internal Revenue Service tax investigation was wholly fact-finding in nature and was
not an administrative hearing in which legal rights of parties may be considered and
determined. The court stated that: "The provision of 5 U.S.C.A. § 1005(b), that a wit-
ness should have a right, under certain circumstances and conditions, to a copy of the
transcript of his testimony refers to 'the official transcript.'" Id. at 740. The neces-
sary inference to be drawn is that if legal rights of parties were in question the witness
would be entitled to presence and advice of counsel; or if a hearing in which legal rights
were to be determined followed the investigation in which testimony was given, the
witness would be entitled to an official transcript of the investigation prior to trial, and,
therefore, the presence of a personal stenographer would be unnecessary.
21. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
22. United States v. Martocci, 60 Crim. 870 (S.D.N.Y. April 4, 1961).
23. United States ex rel. Belfrage v. Kenton, 224 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1955) (immi-
gration proceeding); Couto v. Shaughnessy, 218 F.2d 758, 759 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955) (per curiam) ; Bozell v. United States, 199 F.2d 449, 450 (4th Cir.
1952) (per curiam) (parole board proceeding); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46
(5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950) (per curiam).
24. Administrative Procedure Act § 7(a), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958);
see H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 17 (1946). See also Couto v. Shaugh-
nessy, supra note 23. This was an action for deportation of an alien. The court held
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tion.2m An Internal Revenue Service income tax investigation, however, is not
specifically exempt from the provisions of the act,20 for it does not fall within
either of these two areas. The Administrative Procedure Act appears, therefore,
to be not only a proper, but indeed, the only reasonable alternative for a de-
fendant seeking discovery and inspection in a prosecution for income tax
evasion, in order to avoid the uncertainty of the disposition of his motion under
rules 16 and 17(c).
Adminitrative Law-Right to Inspect Books and Records of a Public
Authority.-The New York Post Corporation desired inspection of the con-
tract files and minutes of meetings of the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Au-
thority, which refused access to the requested records. The Post filed a petition
under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act1 to review the refusal and force in-
spection but the petition was denied by the New York Supreme Court. The
appellate division unanimously reversedi2 reasoning that Triborough was a
"public business" which maintained a "public office," the records of which a
citizen and taxpayer had a statutory right 3 to inspect. The court of appeals,
two judges dissenting, reversed the decision of the appellate division. Tri-
borough is neither a board acting on behalf of the City of New York nor a
public office, but is a public benefit corporation whose books and records are
not open to inspection by taxpayers. New York Post Corp. v. Moses, 10
N.Y.2d 199, 176 NXE.2d 709, 219 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1961).
A public authority is a special public benefit corporation created for the
purpose of public improvement whose obligations are payable solely from its
revenues or property. 4 Triborough, a public benefit corporation, was created
that a deportation proceeding is specifically provided for by statute, and therefore, it is
clearly within the exception set out in § 7(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. This
same principle was voiced in the opinion of a previous deportation case involving a
motion under the Administrative Procedure Act. Marcello v. Abrens, 212 F.2d 830 (Sth
Cir. 1954).
25. H.R. Rep. No. 19S0, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 17 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1946); see Hiatt v. Campagna, 173 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949). The court
held that the activities of a parole board are at the board's discretion, and therefore such
proceedings are not within the application of the Administrative Procedure Act.
26. See ER. Rep. No. 19S0, 79th Cong, 2d Sess. 16 (1946). "In no part of the bill
is any agency exempted by name. The Bill is meant to be operative 'across the board'
in accordance with its terms . . . "
1. N.Y. Cir. Prac. Act §§ 1283-305.
2. 12 App. Div. 2d 243, 210 N.Y.S.2d SS (1st Dep't 1961).
3. See N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 66.
4. Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 Yale Lj.
14 (1937).
5. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 552. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 3(4) defines a public benefit
corporation as one "organized to construct or operate a public improvement wholly or
partly within the state, the profits from which enure to the benefit of this or other state,
or to the people thereof."
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by specific legislation for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a public
highway on a self-sustaining basis. Triborough's books and records are open to
inspection by numerous officials of New York State and the City of New York
and by a trustee designated to represent five per cent of the bondholders of
Triborough7 But no statutory provision expressly allows examination of Tri-
borough's records by a citizen or taxpayer.8 At common law, every person was
entitled to inspect, either personally or by his agent, public records, including
legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest upon which
he might maintain or defend an action, and the document or record sought could
furnish evidence or necessary information. 9 In New York, statutes 0 have en-
larged this common-law right to the extent that any taxpayer may inspect
public records whether or not he bad any immediate or prospective interest."
Under Section 51 of the General Municipal Law all books and records used or
filed in the office of a board acting on behalf of any municipal corporation are
open to the inspection of any taxpayer.' 2 Under Section 66 of the Public
Officers Law any records or papers in a public office within the state are to be
made available in transcript form to any taxpayer upon request.'8
The majority of the present court reasoned that, since Triborough's enabling
statute and other legislation directly affecting it had specifically allowed certain
persons to inspect its books and records, and since no provision had given tax-
payers such a right, it was not the legislative intent to allow inspection by tax-
payers. The court cited Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority,14 which
held that the supreme court has no jurisdiction over equity suits brought
against the Thruway Authority. The Benz court reasoned that the legislature
had intended public authorities to be subject only to procedures specifically
indicated by the legislature'5 and that the legislature had conferred no equity
6. The Comptroller of the State of New York (N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law §§ 560, 2503); the
Governor, the Chairman of the State Finance Committee, the Chairman of the Assembly
Ways and Means Committee (N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2500); the Mayor of New York City
(N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 552); the State Commission of Investigation (N.Y. Unconsol.
Laws § 7502(1)(b) (McKinney 1961)).
7. Gen. Bond Resolutions of Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth. (1960).
8. The decision does not allow Triborough to carry on its operations in secrecy since the
numerous statutory provisions of notes 5 and 6 supra obviate this. Accord, Borah v. White
County Bridge Comm'n, 199 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1952).
9. Fayette County v. Martin, 279 Ky. 387, 130 S.V.2d 838 (1939); Matter of Egan,
205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); North v. Foley, 238 App. Div. 731, 265 N.Y. Supp.
780 (3d Dep't 1933); Shelby County v. Memphis Abstract Co., 140 Tenn. 74, 203 S.W.
339 (1918).
10. N.Y. Munic. Law § 51; N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 66.
11. Matter of Egan, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); North v.,Foley, 238 App, Div.
731, 265 N.Y. Supp. 780 (3d Dep't 1933).
12. N.Y. Munic. Law § 51.
13. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 66.
14. 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d 727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
15. Id. at 490, 174 N.E.2d at 728, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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jurisdiction. 6 The majority in the instant case also rejected the Post's argument
that it had a right of inspection under Section 51 of the General Municipal Law
and Section 66 of the Public Officers Law, pointing out that cases, such as Plumb-
ing Ass'n v. New York State Thruway Authority, 7 had clearly held that a public
authority, although exercising governmental functions, enjoyed a corporate
existence separate and distinct from the state. In Plumbing Ass'n the court
held that Section 135 of the State Finance Law' 8 did not apply to the Thruway
Authority, stating that "although created by the State and subject to dissolu-
tion by the State, these public corporations are independent and autonomous,
deliberately designed to be able to function with a freedom and flexibility not
permitted to an ordinary State board, department or commission '10
Chief Judge Desmond's dissent in the present case classified Triborough as
a board "acting for or on behalf of" New York City and maintained that the
Post had a statutory right to inspect Triborough's records under Section 51 of
the General Municipal Law.20 He found, in Easley v. New York State Thnray
Authority,2' definite criteria upon which to determine whether Triborough was
acting for or on behalf of the city. There the court had held that the New
York State Thruway Authority was, for purposes of court of claims jurisdiction,
"'an arm or agency of the State . . ." owing to its close relationship to the
state.22 The Easley court declared constitutional Section 361(b) of the Public
Authorities Law, which conferred exclusive jurisdiction for tort claims against
the Thruway Authority upon the court of claims. However, if Plumbing Ass'n
did not expressly reject the close relationship test of Easley, it at least confined
16. N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 361(b) gives jurisdiction to the court of claims for tort
and breech of contract claims only.
17. 5 N.Y.2d 420, i5s N.E.2d 238, IS5 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959).
13. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 135 states: "Every officer, board, department, commi-zion or
commissions, charged with the duty of preparing specifications or av. arding or entering
into contracts for the erection, [or] construction . .. of building, for the state, when the
entire cost of such work shall exceed fifty thousand dollar:, must have prepared r:parate
specifications for each of the following three subdivisions of the work to be parformed: 1.
Plumbing and gas fitting. 2. Steam heating, hot water heating . . . 3. Electric wiring
and standard illuminating fixtures."
19. 5 N.Y.2d at 423, 153 N.E.2d at 239, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 536. The instant court implied
that, if anything, Triborough was only an agent of the state, citing Matter of Reynolds,
202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87 (1911). N.Y. Mlunic. Law § 51 had been construed as not to
apply to state officers or agents. See Bull v. Stichman, 29S N.Y. 516, Z0 N.E2d 661 (1948)
(memorandum decision); Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. $20, 106 N.E. 675 (1914);
County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N.Y. 1, 97 N.E. 403 (1912).
20. Chief Judge Desmond pointed out that in an amicus curiae brief in Commisoner
v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1944), Triborough had stated that it acted on
behalf of the city in the issuance of its bonds. The specific question in that cae was
limited to whether Triborough was a "political subdivision" of the state within the
meaning of the phrase in the Internal Revenue Act. 10 N.Y.2d at 206, 176 N.E2d at 712,
219 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12.
21. 1 N.Y.2d 374, 135 N.E.2d 572, 153 N.YS.2d 2S (1956).
22. Id. at 376, 135 N.E.2d at 573, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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it to the Easley facts and the question of jurisdiction over actions against the
Authority. The Plumbing Ass'n court stated in regard to the Easley test:
Certainly, there is a close relationship between the Thruway Authority and the
State, and we simply remarked that fact in upholding the Legislature's power to
confer upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to determine all claims against the
Authority. . . . However close such relationship may be . . . it is abundantly clear
that the Authority stand on its own feet, [and] transacts its business affairs through its
own personnel and on its own initiative .... 23
Chief Judge Desmond further contended that a statute's nature and purpose
should be considered in any construction of its applicability to a public author-
ity. He asserted that the Plumbing Ass'n court had refused to apply Section
135 of the State Finance Law because there was "no reason or necessity for
reading . . . [it] as applicable and applicability would destroy the 'freedom
and flexibility' necessary for functioning." 24 The Chief Judge then distin-
guished the purpose of the statute involved in Plumbing Ass'n and Section 51
of the General Municipal Law, finding the latter statute "of broad sweep."25
It would not appear, however, that section 51 was intended by the legislature
to be of any broader sweep than Section 135 of the State Finance Law20 and
yet section 135 was definitely construed as not applicable to public authori-
ties. 27
In a separate dissent Judge Fuld echoed Chief Judge Desmond's contention
that the nature and purpose of statutes such as Section 51 of the General
Municipal Law and Section 66 of the Public Officers Law demand liberal con-
struction and applicability wherever there is no contrary statutory provision.28
Citing Benz v. New York State Thruway Authority,29 Judge Fuld contended
that this decision pointed up the public office or "state" character of the au-
thority since it is subject to suit only in the court of claims as is the state.
However, the court's decision in Benz was controlled by its decision in Easely
and the Benz court found that the Easley decision "necessarily meant that
there is no jurisdiction in any court of any suit against the Thruway Authority
except as the Legislature has in terms created such jurisdiction."2 0 The Benz
court thereby extended the Easley teaching that the Authority is an arm or
agency of the state so as to allow suit against it in the court of claims (where
the state, and only the state, may be a defendant) by holding the Authority so
much an agent of the state that without a specific waiver of its immunity by
the legislature the Authority might not be sued in equity in the supreme court.
23. 5 N.Y.2d at 424-25, 158 N.E.2d at 240, 185 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
24. 10 N.Y.2d at 207, 176 N.E.2d at 713, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13.
25. Ibid.
26. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 135 pertains to "every officer, board, department, commission
or commissions. . . ." N.Y. Munic. Law § 51 pertains to "all officers, agents, [and]
commissioners ... "
27. Plumbing Ass'n v. New York State Thruway Authority, 5 N.Y.2d 420, 158 N.E.2d
238, 185 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1959).
28. 10 N.Y.2d at 207-08, 176 N.E.2d at 713, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
29. 9 N.Y.2d 486, 174 N.E.2d 727, 215 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1961).
30. Id. at 489, 174 N.E.2d at 728, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
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Since sueable only in the court of claims, which had no equity jurisdiction,3 '
the Authority might never be sued in equity. The Bcnz court made no men-
tion of the holding of Plumbing Ass'n. Yet, Plumbing Ass'n had boldly as-
serted that an authority was separate from the state in spite of the Easley
decision.32 It is implicit in the reasoning and hence the holding of Plumbing
Ass'n that the Easley doctrine of unanimity of an authority with the state is
to be confined to the question of jurisdiction. When Judge Fuld found, in
Benz, indications that the Authority has the character of a "public office," he
failed to read Benz as a decision involving only the question of jurisdiction.
Plumbing Assn is direct holding that a case involving the status of an authority
for jurisdictional purposes is inapplicable to a problem involving the applica-
tion of a statute placing a restriction upon governmental agencies but not
expressly upon an authority.
In view of various statutory provisions allowing inspection of Triborough's
records by numerous representatives of the public, all without mention of a
taxpayer as such, and the designation of authorities as separate corporate en-
tities by decisions, such as Plumbing Assn'n, the majority reasoning would ap-
pear correct. Yet, in light of the recent expansion of undertakings, and thus
the increase of financial expenditures, by public authoritiesP3 it seems prefer-
able that the public in general should have a right to learn of their activities,
and inspect, within reasonable limitations, their records. In 1956 a commission
designated by the legislature to make a comprehensive study of the field
of public authorities within the state made just such a recommendation" 4
At least one effort-in the form of a legislative bill-has been made to change
the law and extend the right of inspection of an authority's records to the
public.35 Unfortunately, the bill moved no further than committee. Perhaps the
increasing need for public scrutiny of authorities and the holding of the present
court will move the legislature to reconsider the matter.
Corporations-Liability of Directors for Mismanaged Mutual Fund
Holdings.-In a derivative action by plaintiff-shareholders of a diversified
open-end mutual fund, defendant directors of the fund and defendant manage-
ment company were charged with having conspired to waste assets to the
detriment of the fund and to the profit and benefit of the defendants in
violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940.1 One of the defendants,
31. There is one exception-N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 363(2), which allows one typ-. of
equity suit against the Thruway Authority.
32. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
33. This is especially true of Triborough: in 1950 it took over the Brooklyn-Battery
Tunnel; in 1953 the East Side Airlines Terminal; in 1956 the New York Colisn-um; and is
now constructing the Verazzano Bridge. See 5 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 46, p. $99 (1956).
34. 5 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 46, pp. 576-77 (1956).
35. N.Y. Assembly No. 977 (Jan. 4, 1961). The bill reads in part "Records of authori-
ties. All contracts, records of leaves of absence, contracts for the purchase or sale of
property and all other records pertaining to the financial condition of any authority shall
be available for public inspection."
1. 54 Stat. 739 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-i to -52 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-19f 0).
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Bullock, was the president and a director of both the fund and the management
company. Defendant Clark was a director of both companies as well as
executive vice-president of the management company. Officers of the man-
agement company were the three vice-presidents, the secretary, and the treasurer
of the fund. The management company was the principal underwriter of the
fund, the sole distributor of its shares, and its investment adviser, with the
duty of supervising its portfolio. The complaint alleged that the directors of
the fund allowed the management company to charge fees far in excess of the
usually accepted rates for similar services, thus constituting an "unlawful
and willful conversion" and a breach of defendants' fiduciary duties.2
The acts complained of were not specifically designated as illegal by any
federal statute. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, and subsequently the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, sustained the action. Applying the so-called doctrine of implication,
Judge Herlands of the district court said, "The clear congressional purpose
[of the Investment Company Act of 1940] was to protect investors and in-
vestment companies by imposing the duty on directors, officers, investment
advisers, and principal underwriters to refrain from committing acts constituting
gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust. It follows that a violation of that
statutory duty renders the violator civilly liable to the victim, and that that
liability may be enforced in a private action brought in the Federal court."
Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 245 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961).
Two months before Brown v. Bullock, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit had reached a contrary conclusion, in Brouk v. Managed
Funds, Inc.3 With substantially the same allegations before it, the court dis-
missed a stockholder's derivative action and an action of the corporation itself
for lack of jurisdiction. The action had succeeded in the trial court but was
reversed on appeal. Inasmuch as the only defendants who appealed were
seven "outside" directors (those with actual or constructive knowledge of the
alleged fraudulent activities as opposed to direct participants), the decision
is distinguishable on this basis. 4
Unlike its four predecessor congressional enactments dealing with securi-
ties regulation,5 the Investment Company0 and the Investment Advisers
2. 194 F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
3. 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961).
4. Judge Herlands made this distinction in deciding the Brown case when he said,
"In the case at bar, the claim as pleaded is not based on per se or vicarious liability
[as it was in the Brouk case] but on collusive or willful violations by the defendants
themselves. . . ." 194 F. Supp. at 247.
5. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1958) (Supp.
II, 1959-1960); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-jj (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
49 Stat. 838, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to z-6 (1958); Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
53 Stat. 1149, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (1958).
6. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1958) (Supp. II,
1959-1960).
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Acts7 of 1940, under which jurisdiction was sought in these cases, do not ex-
pressly provide for private civil actions. The acts neither define the duties of
directors nor sanction suits by a registered investment company against one of
its own directors-at least not expressly. Thus, in the absence of diversity of
citizenship and specific statutory language creating civil liability respecting pri-
vate actions, the jurisdictional problem reduces itself to "whether or not direc-
tors' liability to registered investment companies which they serve has been
created by implication." s
The finding, by implication, of federal jurisdiction is not unknown in the
field of security regulation, but the court in the Brouk case carefully pointed
out that jurisdiction by implication has been accepted only in actions "respect-
ing contracts declared void by the statute and by implying a right of action
for damages in tort for violation of the federal statute."O The Eighth Circuit
held that the doctrine of implication should not be extended to the case at bar
since the 1940 act did not impose upon directors of a registered investment
company any strict liability as insurers or any per se or vicarious liability.10
The effect of the holding then, is to render any claim based upon such liability
as exclusively within state jurisdiction and not cognizable in the federal courts.
The decision, with regard to "outside" directors would appear correct and
desirable since holding them to liability would be tantamount to making them
insurers. In view of the fact that they did not participate in the fraudulent
activities, such an unreasonably harsh interpretation of the 1940 act would
seem unwarranted. The court in the Brouk case however, went beyond this
valid distinction and, in dicta, stated that all directors, whether "outside"
or otherwise, should be immune from suit in the federal courts. The court
took the position that director liability in general was not envisioned or included
within the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Brown court specifically
disagreed "with the views expressed in the Broulk case to the extent that
they restrictively interpret the 1940 Act.""
The plaintiffs in each case claimed jurisdiction under Section 44 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 which provides that criminal jurisdiction for
violations is exclusively in the district courts while civil jurisdiction "of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by, or to enjoin any violation of... the rules ... thereunder ... 2
is concurrently in state and federal courts. The issue in each case is whether
the complaint alleges civil claims arising under the 1940 act, of which the
federal court has jurisdiction by virtue of section 44.
In holding against jurisdiction of private actions, the court in Broul pointed
out that the Investment Company and Advisers Acts of 1940 contained no
7. 54 Stat. 347 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ Sob-1 to -21 (195S) (Supp. II, 1959-
1960).
S. Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 2S6 F.2d 901, 906 (Sth Cir. 1961).
9. Ibid. See also Loss, Securities Regulation 1043-45 (Supp. 1955).
10. 286 F.2d at 918.
11. 194 F. Supp. at 247.
12. 54 Stat. 344 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § SOa-43 (1953).
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provisions for private civil actions although the four previous congressional
enactments pertaining to securities all did.13 The court pointed out that "the
failure to provide for any private civil remedies or for joint and several
liability of directors and persons who commit or contribute to violations or
for statutes of limitations or for conditions is persuasive that the omission
was deliberate."'14 While it is true that the four acts mentioned do contain
provisions for private civil actions,15 such provisions are few in number com-
pared to the total number of prohibitory provisions contained within the acts.
Furthermore, the courts have not restricted private actions to cases coming
within these provisions. Private remedies have been implied notwithstanding
that the same statute expressly provided for other private remedies.' 0 It has,
in fact, been held, in a case under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935,17 that to deny a private action to those for whose protection the statute
was passed "leaves legislation highly publicized as in the public interest in fact
sadly wanting, and even delusive, to that end."' 8
The Restatement of the Law of Torts makes it quite clear that the mere
omission in a statute of a specific provision for private civil actions is by no
means a bar to such an action in the absence of clear legislative intent to the
contrary. 19 In investment company cases, not only is there a complete lack
of evidence of legislative disfavor, but there is an abundance of evidence that
such actions meet with congressional approval.
The 1933 Securities Act and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
concerned only policies of disclosure and securities registration and the regula-
tion of certain securities practices. The Investment Act of 1940 on the other
hand, provided for close supervision and regulation of the entire investment
company business. The act was the result of a four year study of the perils
and manipulations which have beset the field. The statute sought, as it expressly
stated, to mitigate and eliminate the conditions "which adversely affect the
national public interest and the interest of investors." 20 The ability of state
13. See note 5 supra.
14. 286 F.2d at 912.
15. Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-i (1958) ; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b)-r (1958) ; Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 829, 15 U.S.C. § 79p (1958) ; Trust Indenture Act of 1939,
53 Stat. 1176, 15 U.S.C. § 77www (1958).
16. See A.C. Frost Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 43 (1941).
17. 49 Stat. 838 (1935), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79-z-6 (1958).
18. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944).
19. 2 Restatement, Torts § 286 (1934) provides: "The violation of a legislative enact-
ment by doing a prohibited act . . . makes the actor liable for an invasion of an Interest
of another if: (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an
interest of the other as an individual; and, (b) the interest invaded is one which the
enactment is intended to protect; and, (c) where the enactment is intended to protect
an interest from a particular hazard, the invasion of the interest results from that hazard;
and, (d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so con-
ducted himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action."
20. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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courts to regulate effectively such companies was questioned and the statute
enumerated the conditions which threatened "the national public interest and
the interest of investors." It expressly condemned investment companies
managed in the interest of security holders.2'
The Brouk case also reasoned that liability of directors was not intended by
the legislature because Congress had deleted from the original bill a provision
which would have rendered gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust a crime. -2
The House subcommittee hearings reveal, however, that the reasons for remov-
ing the clause was not the elimination of all director liability, but only the
elimination of criminal liability, excepting only larceny and embezzlement
which the statute made criminal.P
The final contention of Brouk was that the courts have consistently rejected
implication of federal jurisdiction in the director liability cases. Of the three
cases 24 cited by the directors in Brouk, none involved the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940. In addition, in each case the decision rested on grounds other
than that the defendants were directors. In one case the conduct upon which
jurisdiction was claimed had never been prohibited by the statute and the court
pointed out that even if plaintiff had amended his complaint, "the complaint
would still stop short of being legally sufficient unless it stated facts showing
that the loss suffered happened in a way the statute was enacted to prevent." s2
The other two caseses were both dismissed because the specific subdivisions
21. 54 Stat. 7S9 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § SOa-i(b)(2) (1953).
22. 286 F.2d at 912.
23. The reason for removal was that it had subjected persons to criminal liability for
violation of indefinite standards impossible of determination. With the exception of
larceny and embezzlement then, liability was reduced from criminal to civil but was
not eliminated. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., H.R. 10065, at 124 (1940). See also Greene,
Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 23 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 266, 270-71, 234 (1959); Jaretzhi, The Investment Company Act of
1940, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 303, 344 (1941).
24. Howard v. Furst, 23S F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 US. 937 (1957);
Birnbaum v. Nev.port Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952); Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 813 (1947).
25. Downing v. Howard, supra note 24, at 659. The court also stated that "the fatal
obstacle to the plaintiff's complaint on this score is that the legislation does not require
the company to furnish a plan. A cause of action can hardly be based upon diobdience
of the statute when the statute does not require the act, the non-doing of which is
complained of by the plaintiff." Id. at 656.
26. In Howard v. Furst, 233 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1956) the court smid, "We find
nothing in the language of Section 14(a) or in the legisltive history of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to warrant an inference that it was the intention of the Congrem
to create any rights whatever in a corporation whose stockholders may be solicited by
proxy statements prepared in contravention of the statutory mandate." In Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952) it was held that "the absence of a
similar provision in Section 10(b) strengthens the conclusion that that section was directed
solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated v.th the
sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate
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of the acts sued under were not intended to protect the individual investor.
The general intent behind all congressional security enactments is the protec-
tion of the investor, but within any one act, subdivisions may be directed to
specific parties or classes as was the situation in these two cases. 27 The Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, however, is specifically intended for the protection
of the investor. The overriding purpose of the act was to shield the individual
from the fraudulent investment company practices, such as those alleged both
in Bro-uk and in Brown, which had become prevalent. 28
Thus, in Cogan v. Johnston,2 9 where officers and directors of an investment
company were charged with gross abuse of trust under sections 36 and 44
of the 1940 act, the court held that the claim, so far as it was based on section 36,
could not be sustained because section 36 authorizes the Commission to bring
an action in respect to a registered investment company,3 0 whereas here the
company was not registered. However, the court concluded that by virtue
of the alleged conduct of the individual defendants, jurisdiction under section
44 was properly invoked. The court refused to dismiss the claim since "it...
does not appear to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which may be proved in support of his claim."3 1
In Schwartz v. Bowman32 and Breswick & Co. v. Briggs,83 jurisdiction by
implication was found to permit shareholders' suits against corporate directors
who, it was alleged, had conspired to violate the Investment Act of 1940. The
Schwartz and Breswick cases, both directly in point, are properly distinguished
from Brouk only if the latter decision is restricted to "outside" directors. This
distinction is vital and necessary since fear of personal liability will serve as a
constant reminder to "Inside" directors that sanctions for their misbehavior
exist.34
"Inside" or participating directors have within their trust the savings of the
public to be invested as they and their staff think best. It is a trust which
should admit of close governmental scrutiny and liberal judicial enforcement
in the public interest. As the case law indicates, it is not necessary to subject
affairs, and that Rule X-10B-5 [under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] extended protec-
tion only to the defrauded purchaser or seller. Since the complaint failed to allege that
any of the plaintiffs fell within either class, the judgment of the district court was correct
and is accordingy affirmed."
27. Howard v. Furst and Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., supra note 26.
28. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
29. 162 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
30. 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958).
31. 162 F. Supp. at 909.
32. 156 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
33. 135 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
34. This fear of personal liability also renders unlikely the possibility of multitudinous
strike suits arising under the act, and the consequent expansion of federal jurisdlction.
Furthermore, most suits of this type would be admissible in federal courts in any case,
with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. This is usually true since either the
investment company is incorporated in more than one state, or their stockholders and
officers reside in various states.
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all directors to absolute liability as insurers, but those who do engage in
fraudulent activities should be held answerable in the federal courts under the
1940 act. This conclusion is supported by both legislative intent and judicial
precedent.
Corporations-Promotion of Intrastate Sales by Foreign Corporation
Constitutes Intrastate Commerce.-Eli Lilly & Co., an Indiana pharma-
ceutical corporation, sought an injunction under the New Jersey Fair Trade
Act,1 against a retailer, Say-On-Drugs, Inc., which had sold Lilly's products at
a price lower than the fair trade price. Say-On moved for a dismissal under a
New Jersey statute which made unenforceable in New Jersey courts any con-
tract entered into by a foreign corporation which had failed to obtain a
certificate authorizing it to do business in that state.3 The trial court dismised
the action, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed.4 The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed and held that Eli Lilly by inducing "one
local merchant to buy a particular class of goods from another . . ." was
engaged in a local, intrastate activity and therefore was subject to New Jersey
licensing requirements. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276
(1961).
Eli Lilly maintained an office in New Jersey, was listed in the Newark
telephone directory, and employed there a district manager, a secretary and
eighteen detailmen, all of whom were paid on a salary basis by Lilly. It was
the job of these detailmen "to visit retail pharmacists, physicians and hospitals
in order to acquaint them with the products of . . . [Lilly] with a view to
encouraging the use of these products." They also examined the stock of the
retailer, made recommendations as to needs, and supplied free promotional and
advertising materials. Occasionally, as a convenience to the retailer, they would
receive an order and forward it to a wholesaler. However, all sales were made
through independent wholesalers to whom Lilly sold exclusively in New Jersey,
the shipments coming from out of state. It was assumed by the Court that the
sales to wholesalers constituted an interstate business.7
The question of what constitutes "doing business" has produced three distinct
lines of decisions in the Supreme Court, namely, cases concerning a state's
power "(1) to tax an interstate enterprise, (2) to subject it to local suits, and,
(3) to license it.. .. I's For a state to assert jurisdiction in any event some
contacts must exist between the state and the person or entity it seeks to tax,
1. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:4-6 (1940).
2. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14:15-3, 4 (1939).
3. Several states have statutes similar to New Jersey's. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 30405
(1948); Miss. Code Ann. § 5344 (1957); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 218.
4. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 31 N.J. 591, 153 A.2d 523 (1960).
5. 365 U.S. 276, 282 (1961).
6. Id. at 2S0.
7. Id. at 27S.
8. Id. at 2S9 (dissenting opinion).
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license, or subject to service of process.9 For the purpose of service of process the
number of contacts required would appear to be quantitatively less than the
number required for the purpose of taxation or qualification. 10
In the area of taxation not only must the sufficiency of the contact be
considered, but more important, the prerogative of Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce"1 against the right of the states to demand from foreign corpo-
rations reimbursement for the protection afforded them within the states must
also be weighed. 12 Under this test taxes levied on the privilege of doing
business, 13 and taxes which give local business an unfair advantage' 4 or subject
a foreign corporation to double taxation' 5 have been found to be unconstitu-
tional restrictions upon interstate commerce. Much of the uncertainty sur-
rounding taxation, however, has been removed to the satisfaction of the states
by the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota,'6 which allowed the states to levy an apportioned income tax on
foreign corporations operating within their borders, even though they were
engaging exclusively in interstate commerce.17
In reference to state licensing requirements, "doing business" has been inter-
preted to mean a local or intrastate business.' 8 The importance of this area of
9. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10. The Courts in resolving the problem of "doing business" respecting service of
process have developed the theories of implied consent, Railroad Co. v. Harris, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 65 (1870); presence, Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S.
264 (1917); and the modem test of minimum contacts as enunciated in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In this area today it would appear that
the extent of contact is not of as much concern as is the convenience of the litigants
and the legitimacy of the interest the state is attempting to protect by the enforcement
of its process. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; 18 Fletcher,
Private Corporations § 8713.1 (Perm. ed. rev. repl. 1955).
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
12. Justice Stone has said, "[C]ourts are called upon to reconcile competing consti-
tutional demands, that commerce between the states shall not be unduly Impeded by state
action, and that the power to lay taxes for the support of state government shall not be
unduly curtailed." McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48 (1940).
13. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
14. See Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
15. See Michigan-Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); J. D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
16. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
17. "We conclude that net income from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation
may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly
apportioned to local activities within the taxing State forming sufficient nexus to support
'the same." Id. at 452. Legislative reaction to the Court's decision in the North-
western case was swift. A statute was passed immunizing from state taxation income
derived from the interstate sales of a foreign corporation, whose only contact with a state
was the solicitation of orders. See 73 Stat. 555 (1959), 15 U.S.C. § 381 (Supp. II, 1959-
1960).
18. See Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914); International Textbook Co.
v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
the law was increased significantly by the Court's decision in Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co.19 Prior to this case a foreign corporation, barred from a state
court because of its failure to qualify, could on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship seek relief in a federal court. Woods applied the rule of Erie RI?. v.
Tompkins2 0 to bar the action in the federal court because under state law it
was barred in the state court.
No set rules determine whether a corporation is or is not engaging in
intrastate commerce and each case is decided upon its own facts.2 ' In the
field of sales solicitation, however, there are instances where the outcome can
be predicted with some certainty. The presence of a salesman in a state to
solicit orders which are accepted and filled from out of state,2 the maintenance
of truck terminals,23 and dealing through an independent wholesaler or a
commissioned broker in a state,2-4 all have been held not to constitute "doing
business."
The conclusion of the Court that Eli Lilly was engaged in intrastate com-
merce was based almost entirely on the activities of Lilly's detailmen. It was
the Court's view that these detailmen, by "promoting . . . Lilly's products
... to the physicians, hospitals and retailers who buy those products in intra-
state commerce... ,"25 were themselves engaging in intrastate commerce. The
rule of Cizeney Bros. v. Massachusetts'0 was considered to be controlling.
There the facts were substantially the same but with one important difference;-
the salesmen in Cheney regdarly took orders from retailers for wholesalers. The
Court there said of this activity: "Of course this is a domestic business-
inducing one local merchant to buy a particular class of goods from an-
other .. ."2 It is to be noted that the principal function of the salesmen in
Cheney was the solicitation of local orders for wholesalers, whereas in the instant
case the primary purpose of the detailmen was simply to encourage retailer
purchases of Lilly's products. By equating the two activities the instant Court
expanded the meaning of "doing business" from the actual taking of orders to
encompass activities which are preparatory to sale, namely promotion and
advertisement.
In a concurring opinion in the instant case Justice Harlan applied a test
which had been used-' to determine the validity of state taxes imposed on the
19. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. See Stem, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.XA.J. 823 (1955).
22. See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 4S9 (ISS7).
23. See Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
24. J. R. Watkins Co. v. Flynt, 220 Aiss. 371, 72 So. 2d 195 (1954); Levine v.
"rallitzer, 130 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Holloway Material & Supply Co. v. Perfcc-
tion Oak Flooring Co., 191 Okla. 350, 130 P.2d 296 (1942).
25. 366 U.S. at 231.
26. 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
27. The Court in the instant case recognized the distinction but felt it %vas unim-
portant. 366 U.S. at 282.
28. 246 U.S. at 155.
29. "It is now well settled that a tax imposed on a local activity related to interstate
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local activities of foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce, i.e.,
since product promotion among retailers is not necessary to Lilly's continued
freedom of access to the local market,30 such promotion should therefore be
considered "local business" subject to state licensing requirements. Justice
Harlan never referred to Lilly's "local business" as intrastate commerce. It
would appear that the Justice recognized that such activities are something less
than intrastate commerce, yet he is urging that a new test be adopted to
determine whether a corporation, admittedly engaged in interstate commerce,
should be made subject to local licensing requirements.
In dissenting,31 Justice Douglas objected that the present ruling would destroy
the long established precedent of the "Drummer Cases, ' 3 2 which held that
solicitation of orders to be filled from out-of-state by a foreign corporation
through local salesmen was in furtherance of interstate commerce and therefore,
beyond the power of the states in the areas of taxation and qualification. 3
It is clear, however, that Lilly's detailmen did not properly fall within the
category of "drummers." These detailmen did not solicit orders for out-of-state
goods as salesmen would; rather they pointed out a need or manufactured a
desire within the local market for their employer's product. The dissent also
pointed out that only two years previously, activities such as Lilly's carried
on by a foreign corporation had been found by the same Court, in Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,8 4 to be "exclusively in furtherance
commerce is valid if, and only if, the local activity is not such an integral part of the
interstate process, the flow of commerce, that it cannot realistically be separated from
it." Michigan-Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 (1954); see Memphis
Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 87 (1948); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258 (1938).
30. A state "has no power to exclude from its limits foreign corporations or others
engaged in interstate commerce, or by the imposition of conditions to fetter their right
to carry on such commerce, or to subject them in respect to their transactions therein
to requirements which are unreasonable or pass beyond the bounds of suitable local
protection." Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197, 201 (1914); see 17 Fletcher,
Private Corporations §§ 8402, 8409 (Perm. ed. rev. repl. 1960).
31. 366 U.S. at 288 (dissenting opinion).
32. See, e.g., Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915); Browning v. City of Waycross,
233 U.S. 16 (1914); Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914); Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
33. By far the greater majority of cases on this subject are concerned with taxation.
34. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Here the appellant had a sales office in Minnesota and em-
ployed there a district manager, a secretary, and four salesmen, all of whom were paid
a salary. The salesmen contacted potential users of cement products, solicited and took
orders which they sent to local dealers. "Through this system appellant's salesmen would
in effect secure orders for local dealers. . . ." Id. at 455. See also note 17 supra. In
the Senate report dealing with the advisability of a bill to counteract the effect of the
Northwestern case in the area of sales solicitation, it was the minority's view that such
legislation would be rash. However, it added that "it should be borne in mind that the
subject of this bill is a tax on net income. . . . We are not here considering licensing
or franchise regulations .. .which might truly set up barriers to interstate commerce."
2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 2548, 2556 (1959).
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of interstate commerce.. ."3---a determination which, the dissent stated, the
majority chose to ignore completelyP0
If the Court found here facts to warrant a finding that Lilly was a legitimate
object of New Jersey regulation, the result could have been reached without
resorting to an expansion of the local solicitation rule of the Chzeney case to
include product promotion. The Court need only have relied on the fact that
the detailmen did on occasion receive local orders from retailers.sT As it stands
now the Court's holding could lead to some regrettable and even absurd
results3S For, if it be true that inducing retail trade constitutes a local business
and that the same rule can be applied to retailer-consumer transactions as well
as to wholesaler-retailer transactions, 39 then corporations instituting nationwide
advertising campaigns might be said to satisfy the requirement merely by moving
the general public to purchase its products from local vendors. Under this
reasoning some of our larger corporations might well be held to be doing
business in every state in the union. The only difference between this ultimate
proposition and the present case is that the inducement here was the product
of Lilly's own agents and employees whereas the magazine or newspaper carry-
ing advertising would not be the agent or employee of the foreign corporation.
Criminal Law-Reindictment Held a Denial of Due Process When Prior
Indictment for Same Felony Was Dismissed for Want of Speedy Tri.-
In January 1955, defendant was indicted for felonies allegediy committed in
June 1954. In October 1956, after arraignment on the 1955 indictment, de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had been
denied a speedy trial was denied, and defendant pleaded guilty. In December
1957, the appellate division found that he had been denied a speedy trial and
dismissed the indictment, but without prejudice to the right of the People to
proceed with a new indictment "as permitted in section 673 of the code, if so
advised."1 The defendant was accordingly reindicted in November 1958 for the
same crime. The county court sustained the second indictment against a motion
35. 353 U.. at 452.
36. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion does refer to the Court's finding in the
Northwestern case but considers it to be "a casual reference" and therefore not to be of
any controlling value in the instant case. 366 US. at 2S6-S7 n.3.
37. 366 U.S. at 280.
3S. Justice Douglas warned that the rule in the present case could prove dangerous
and that by its use " a State can stand over the channels of interstate commerce... "
366 US. at 292 (dissenting opinion).
39. The majority of the present Court intimates that the rule might be extended to
cover consumer-retailer transactions. 366 U.S. at 273, 231.
1. People v. Wilson, 5 App. Div. 2d 690, 169 N.Y.S.2d 285, 2S6 (2d Dep't 1957).
The N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 673 provides: "An order for the dismiszal of the action,
as provided in this chapter, is a bar to another prosecution for the Eame offens, if it be
a misdemeanor; but, except as provided in section sLx hundred sixty-nine-a hereof, it is
not a bar, if the offense charged be a felony."
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to dismiss,2 holding that the delay after the first indictment had no effect as to
defendant's rights under a substituted indictment because any reckoning of
delay was to be measured from the date of the new indictment.8 Defendant's
conviction after a plea of guilty in June 1959, was unanimously affirmed by the
appellate division. 4 The court of appeals, however, reversed and dismissed the
indictment, two judges dissenting.5 The right to a prompt trial is a funda-
mental one and defendant was denied due process when he was reindicted and
brought to trial four and one half years after the original indictment. People
v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 391, 171 N.E.2d 310, 208 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1960).
The necessity of a speedy trial for the protection of a defendant is im-
mediately apparent. In the leading New York case, People v. Prosser, the
court of appeals stressed that without such protection the accused could for a
long period of time be subject to public distrust and suspicion, based on an
untried accusation. A speedy trial would protect the accused from prolonged
imprisonment, if held to await trial, and minimize the danger of his inability
to prove his innocence due to the loss of witnesses and the dulling of memory.
The right to a speedy trial existed at common law,7 and was expressly guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.8 It has been
said, however, that the sixth amendment does not apply to state criminal
prosecutions9 and there is in New York no constitutional guarantee of a speedy
trial. It is, however, a statutory right.10 Further,
2. People v. Wilson, 15 Misc. 2d 858, 182 N.Y.S.2d 842 (Queens County Ct. 1959).
3. "[T]he court is constrained to follow the law of this State which measures the undue
delay in such a case from the time the particular indictment to which the motion Is
addressed was found. Such a dismissal does not bar the District Attorney from proceed-
ing to obtain a new indictment under section 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
if the offense charged, as in this case, be a felony." Id. at 860, 182 N.Y.S.2d at 844.
4. People v. Wilson, 10 App. Div. 2d 297, 200 N.Y.S.2d 792 (2d Dep't 1960).
5. Chief Judge Desmond wrote the majority opinion, in which Judges Fuld, Van
Voorhis, Burke, and Foster concurred. Judge Froessel wrote the dissenting opinion, In
which Judge Dye concurred.
6. 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1955).
7. See 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence; Book II, ch. X (1827); 2 Hale,
History of the Common Law of England 141 (5th ed. 1794). Under a commission to the
judges of general gaol delivery, they were empowered to try and deliver every prisoner,
whereby the jails were generally cleared at least twice in each year. See In re Begerow,
133 Cal. 349, 65 Pac. 828 (1901); State v. Clark, 86 Ore. 464, 168 Pac. 944 (1917);
State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122 (1908).
8. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
9. See Baker v. Utecht, 161 F.2d 304, 305 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 856 (1947)
Chick v. Kentucky, 140 F. Supp. 418 (E.1. Ky. 1956). See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 26 (1949); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947) ; People v. Jelke, 284
App. Div. 211, 225, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 308 N.Y. 56, 62, 123 N.E.2d
769, 771 (1954) ; People v. Gearns, 14 Misc. 2d 1010, 180 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
10. "In a criminal action the defendant is entitled ... to a speedy and public trial. .... "
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if a defendant, indicted for a crime whose trial has not been postponed upon his
application, be not brought to trial at the next term of the court in v,,hich the
indictment is triable, after it is found the court may, on application of the defendant,
order the indictment to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shoywn.2
The statutory guarantee inures to the benefit of any person under indictment,
whether he be imprisoned to await trial on the pending charge, or whether he
be a prisoner already serving a sentence in the same jurisdiction for a different
crime, or whether he be admitted to bail.1 2 In New York, the state has the
burden of proceeding with arraignment and of bringing the accused speedily
to trial. The mere failure of the accused to take affirmative action to prevent
delay may not be construed or treated as a waiver of his statutory right.23 The
accused has the right to assume that, if the district attorney intends to prose-
cute the indictment, he will do so with reasonable dispatch.' 4 What constitutes
"undue delay" presents a factual issue and no single criterion of fact is con-
sidered decisive of the issue.11
In finding that the defendant in the instant case had been denied due
process of law by reindictment after dismissal of a prior indictment for want of
a speedy trial, heavy emphasis was placed on the reasoning of People v. Pros-
ser.'6 The majority asserted that the right to a prompt trial is no less funda-
mental in New York simply because it is not contained in the state constitution.
It held that the statutory right to a speedy and public trial "cannot be reason-
ably reconciled" with Sections 142 and 673 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 142 sets a five year limitation for the commencement of a prosecution
N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § S. This is repeated in § 12 of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial. 2'
11. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 663.
12. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 356, 130 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1955); People v.
Corrado, 150 Misc. 787, 270 N.Y. Supp. 235 (CL Gen. Sess. 1934).
13. People v. Prosser, supra note 12; People v. Serio, 13 Misc. 2d 973, 181 N.Y.S2d
340 (Erie County Ct. 1958); People v. Ester, 4 Misc. 2d 651, 153 N.Y32d Co (Queens
County CL 1956); People v. Winter, 13 Misc. 2d 205, 132 N.YS2d 254 (CL Gen. Se-,-
1958); People v. Brandfon, 4 Misc. 2d 466, 157 N.Y.S.2d 864 (CL Spc. SeCZ. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 679, 163 N.Y.S.2d IC07 (2d Dep't 1957).
14. People v. Winter, 1S Mlisc. 2d 205, 203, 182 N.Y.S.2d 254, 2M0. The accuted,
however, has the duty of raising his objection by motion that the prosecution has bea
delayed without good cause. People v. Begue, 1 App. Div. 2d 289, 149 N.YS.2d 791 (3d
Dep't 1956).
15. People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d S91 (1955); People v. Godwin, 2 App.
Div. 2d 346, 156 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d S91, 141 N.E2d 629, 161
N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957); People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 62, 64 N.Y. Supp. 433, 436 (4th Dzp't
1900); People v. Haver, 26 lisc. 2d 565, 209 N.Y.S2d 1 4 (Oneida County CL 1961).
This does not mean that a defendant may not waive his right by consenting to a dday in
bringing the indictment to trial. People v. Perry, 196 Misc. 922, 96 N.Y.S.2d 517 (St. Law-
rence County Ct. 1949). Waiver may be implied from the fact that although the defendant
was present in court he interposed no objection to a postponement sought by the district
attorney. People v. ProsSer, supra.
16. 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
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of a felony,' 7 while section 673 of the Code provides that an order for dismissal
will not bar reindictment if the offense is a felony.18 The majority asserted that
if these statutes were applied literally, the State of New York would present a
fundamental right with one hand only to deny it with the other, as a strict
reading of these statutes would allow reindictment any time within five years
after the commission of the felony; this even though a prior indictment had
been dismissed for want of a speedy trial. Such a result, the majority reasoned,
would be "incongruous" and "cannot be squared with the guarantee of a
speedy trial as found in the other statutes."'19
The court cautioned, however, that its decision does not mean that there
can never be a reindictment under section 673 after an indictment has been
dismissed for delay. 20 Cognizance was taken of the fact that there might be
other cases in which, although the first trial were not brought on for trial at
the next term of the court, the delay would be so minor that due process would
not be violated by permitting a reindictment of the accused. The court rea-
soned that in each case the question to be decided is whether there has been
such delay as to deny the defendant a fair opportunity to prove his innocence,
and that question is not automatically determined by the five year statute
of limitations established by Section 142 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Since the right to a speedy trial is granted by statute in New York, the dissent
reasoned, the statutory scheme which the legislature saw fit to enact should be
literally applied. The dissent considered the right to a prompt trial a qualified
one. Since it is not an absolute right it "may be given operative effect only in
the light of the limitation period prescribed by statute." 2 ' It found in the pre-
vailing opinion a complete disregard for "the plain language of section 673"22
and a judicial forging of a "new limitation period for felonies, lesser than, and
in contravention of, the five year period prescribed by the Legislature." 23 In
the view of the dissent the suspicion and anxiety attendant upon an untried ac-
cusation of crime comes into existence when the defendant has been indicted. If
there has been an undue delay in bringing the defendant to trial, the defendant
is entitled to remove that cloud of doubt hanging over him by having the indict-
ment dismissed. But he is not entitled to absolute immunity from prosecution
until such time as the statute of limitations has run. Taking note that the ma-
jority stated that it did not mean that there could never be a reindictment under
673, the dissent asserted that the criteria should be those found in the statute
itself. It also warned of the "great danger" in the complete liberation of a de-
17. "A prosecution for a felony, other than murder or kidnapping, or a prosecution for
the crime of conspiracy to commit a felony must be commenced within five years after Its
commission, except where a lesser time is prescribed by statute .... " N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 142.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. 8 N.Y.2d at 395, 171 N.E.2d at 312-13, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 965-66.
20. Id. at 396, 171 N.E.2d at 313, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
21. Id. at 397, 171 N.E.2d at 314, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
22. Id. at 400, 171 N.E.2d at 315, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 969.
23. Id. at 397, 171 N.E.2d at 314, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
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fendant merely because of some oversight or neglect in the office of the district
attorney, when the statute of limitations has not run.
Although the dissent is obviously correct in stating that the statutes liter-
ally interpreted would permit reindictment in a case such as the instant one,
much greater merit is found in the argument of the majority that a "group of
statutes must not be so read as to defeat the fundamental right of an accused
citizen to be brought to trial and to be given a fair opportunity to show his
innocence."24 The position of the dissent would not appear to be entirely
sound because if the original indictment was dismissed because of prejudicial
delay in granting the defendant a trial, it is difficult to understand how a new
indictment after so long a period of time is not subject to exactly the same
criticism of essential unfairness to the accused, if not more so.
The instant decision is by no means an extreme innovation; it is merely a
logical corollary which would seem to follow inevitably from the reasoning
which the Court of Appeals had earlier enunciated unanimously in People v.
Prosser:
The speedy trial guarantee, preventing undue delay between the time of indictment
and trial, serves a threefold purpose. It protects the accused, if held in jail to
await trial, against prolonged imprisonment; it relieves him of the anxiety and
public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation of crime; and, finally, Mlke
statutes of limitation, it prevents him from being "exposed to the hazard of a trial,
after so great a lapse of time" that "the means of proving his innocence may not
be within his reach"--as, for instance, by the loss of witnesses or the dulling of
memory.25
The present decision is an amplification of the basic rule that there must not
be an undue delay in prosecution which would deny the defendant a fair op-
portunity to prove his innocence. The import of the decision is not to declare
the five year statute of limitations unconstitutional but rather to declare that
it was not intended as the sole criterion of what constitutes undue delay and,
therefore, the denial of a speedy trial.
Grand Jury-Evidence Obtained From Testimony of Prospective De-
fendant Cannot Be Used as Basis of Indictment.-Defendant, a supplier of
tires to the city of Utica, made sales to the city without the competitive bidding
required by statute.1 An extraordinary special and trial term of the New York
Supreme Court and an extraordinary grand jury were created and authorized
to inquire into prostitution, gambling, and official corruption in the county of
Oneida. The defendant was served with a subpoena duces tecum and was
required to appear with all books and records for the period being investigated.
His accountant was also subpoened and instructed to bring defendant's income
24. Id. at 394, 171 N.E.2d at 312, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
25. 309 N.Y. at 356, 130 N.E.2d at 893 (1955).
I. N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 120 requires competitive bidding for contracts In
excess of five hundred dollars.
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tax returns, work sheets, and ledgers. Subsequent to the defendant's appearance,
the Governor extended the powers of the extraordinary term to include violations
of the tax law. Defendant was then indicted and convicted on evidence directly
derived from his books and testimony, for violation of the state tax law. 2
The conviction was affirmed by the appellate division.3 The court of appeals,
two judges dissenting, reversed, holding that appellant was a prospective
defendant who could not be compelled to testify, and thus such evidence might
not be used as a basis for indictment. People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176
N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961).
For many years it was the rule in New York that automatic immunity was
given to witnesses or prospective defendants testifying before a grand jury.4
This immunity could not be denied unless waived by the witness himself.5 In
People v. Gillette6 the court held that
a person against whom the inquiry of the grand jury is directed should not be re-
quired to attend before that body, much less be sworn by it, and if he is and an
indictment be found, it should be set aside upon motion, and if not, if the fact
appears upon the trial, it will invalidate a conviction if one be had.
However, the passage of the Witnesses' Immunity Statute,7 which was intended
"to avoid the inadvertent conferring of immunity upon witnesses unsuspected
of the wrongdoing they themselves ultimately disclosed . . . ," gave rise to a
problem of interpretation and of constitutionality. The dissenting opinion in
People v. DeFeo9 implied that the statute was unconstitutional,10 while a
concurring opinion implied that Gillette might still be ruling law." The
2. N.Y. Tax Law § 376(4); (now N.Y. Tax Law § 376(5)).
3. 12 App. Div. 2d 880, 211 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dep't 1961) (memorandum decision).
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1936, ch. 329, § 1; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1910, ch. 395, amended by
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 774, § 1; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1904, ch. 659, § 1. These statutes
are now N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 381, 584 and 380, respectively, amended, 1953, to conform to
N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447.
5. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2446.
6. 126 App. Div. 665, 670, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133, 136 (1st Dep't 1908). In this case
defendant was indicted for perjury after testifying before a grand jury investigating
violations of criminal laws by officers of insurance companies. Defendant had been
questioned concerning a bank account in his name as trustee for his employer insurance
company. See also People v. Haines, 6 N.Y. Crim. 100, 1 N.Y. Supp. 55 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1888).
7. N.Y. Pen. Law § 2447.
8. 10 N.Y.2d 161, 172, 176 N.E.2d 571, 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 656-57 (1961).
9. 284 App. Div. 622, 131 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1st Dep't 1954), rev'd on other grounds,
308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
10. "As the immunity granted was not complete, the testimony given by appellant ...
was also elicited in violation of his constitutional rights. . . . Id. at 638, 131 N.Y.S.2d
at 822.
11. "It is not necessary in my view to decide whether the recent immunity statute in
effect overrides People v. Gillette . .. 1 Id. at 632, 131 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (Peck, P. J.,
concurring) (Italics omitted).
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appellate division in People v. Steuding,a' relying on the Dre-o dictum,13
held that the defendant obtained immunity and that the statute was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it provided that compliance with its provisions was the
only manner in which immunity might be conferred.' 4 The court of appeals,
in affirming, however, held that
a prospective defendant or one who is a target of an investigation may not be called
and exmined before a Grand Jury and, if he is, his constitutionally-conferred
privilege against self incrimination is deemed violated even though he does not
claim or assert the privilege.' 5
Thus in Steding the court of appeals did not invalidate the Immunity Statute,
but as one author has stated, the statute "must have been intended to apply
only to witnesses and not to prospective defendants .... ,10 The only question
seemingly presented under this interpretation was whether a defendant was at
the time of the investigation a witness or a prospective defendant. If a wit-
ness, the technical requirements of the statute would have to be satis-
fied17 and a failure to do so would constitute a waiver of his immunity. If a-
prospective defendant, he need not fulfill the requirements of the statute1 s
The court of appeals in the present case first determined that the appellant
was a prospective defendant, notwithstanding that the basis for his indictment
did not fall within the scope of the grand jury's original investigation. Thus
12. 7 App. Div. 2d 566, 15 N.Y.S.2d 34 (3d Dcp't), aff'd, 6 N.Y.S.2d 214, 160 N.E2d
468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
13. The DeFeo majority decision e-pressed no concern over the constitutionality of
the statute. Thus the appellate division in Steuding must have felt free to decide this
question.
14. Under certain immunity statutes the witness has no election. He is required to
testify, but receives immunity. People v. Reiss, 255 App. Div. 509, 8 N.YS.2d 20?
(1st Dep't 1938), aff'd mem., 2S0 N.Y. 539, 20 N.E.2d 3 (1939) ; Seymour v. Larhin, 254 App.
Div. 215, 4 N.Y.S2d 423 (4th Dep't 193S); In the Matter of Solove, 250 App. Div. 117,
293 N.Y. Supp. 640 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem., 276 N.Y. 647, 12 N.E.2d Z02 (1938), con-
struing N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 1631, 3SI and 5S4 prior to their amendment to conform to N.Y.
Pen. Law § 2447. But where a constitutional provision, unaffected by an immunity statute,
is directly involved, the necessity of invoking constitutional protection is dependant upon
the attendant circumstances. People v. Ferola, 215 N.Y. 285, 109 N.E. 500 (1915). Sea
also People ex rel Coyle v. Truesdell, 259 App. Div. 232, 13 N.YS.2d 947 (2d Dep't
1940).
15. 6 N%..2d 214, 216-17, 160 N.E.2d 468, 469, 1S9 N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (1959).
16. McKay, Constitutional Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1359, 1365 (1959), here the author
notes that the Steuding decision construing the statute was "in a cryptic opinion."
17. Briefly summarized, the Immunity Statute provides that in order to obtain com-
plete immunity, a witness (including a prospective defendant) must (1) affirmatively
claim his privilege against self-incrimination, (2) be directed or ordered to anm-er by
competent authority, for instance a grand jury at the request of the proacutor, and
(3) testify. People v. DeFeo, 284 App. Div. 622, 629, 131 N.Y..2d S06, 313-14 (1954).
18. 10 N.Y.2d at 172, 176 N.E.2d at 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 656. The court went on to
say that if he is examined his constitutionally conferred privilege is violated, even though
he did not assert the privilege.
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the evidence may not be used as a basis for his indictment. 1 He was not,
however, afforded complete immunity, and might be reindicted should evidence
other than that obtained through his testimony be found."° None of the
tainted testimony might be used against him, since defendant had testified
under compulsion of subpoena. 21
While the majority of the court of appeals in Steuding and in the instant
case, and the appellate division in DeFeo felt secure that the statutory pur-
pose-to eliminate automatic and complete immunity-would be accom-
plished, the dissenters in each case indicated the fear that once the witness
has testified, any subsequent indictment would automatically convert his
status to that of a prospective defendant. While it is true that a defendant
may be reindicted if sufficient evidence (obtained independently of the evi-
dence, links, or leads furnished by the prospective defendant in violation of
his constitutional privilege) is adduced, 22 he is protected insofar as the tes-
timony under compulsion tends to incriminate him. The fear is, therefore, not
unfounded since a defendant will have complete immunity as to his entire
testimony and all links and leads furnished by that testimony. As a result,
the purpose of the statute may be completely frustrated.
To avoid this interpretation the Steuding dissent attempted to distinguish
DeFeo on the ground that the DeFeo defendant did not know of his rights,
did not claim his privilege, and did not sign any waiver of immunity; while
in Steuding, the dissent argued, the defendant did waive his immunity, and
also knew the purpose and scope of the inquiry.23 Moreover, it was stated
19. This interpretation of the New York constitution is well-established and Is no
longer open to question. Id. at 171, 176 N.E.2d at 577, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 655; cf. N.Y.
Const. art. I, § 6. "Whether [he] . . . was a prospective defendant is not to be deter-
mined by a subjective examination of the mind of the prosecutor. The scope of the
inquiry made [him] . . . a possible defendant. . . . [He] . . . was on the target even
if perchance he was not to be the bull's eye." People v. DeFoe, 284 App. Div. 622, 627,
131 N.Y.S.2d 806, 812 (1st Dep't 1954). See also People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356, 128
N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
20. 10 N.Y.2d at 173, 176 N.E.2d at 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 657. See also Matter of
Ryan, 7 N.Y.2d 989, 166 N.E.2d 504, 199 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1960) (memorandum decision)
(reindictment of defendant in the Steuding case); People v. Ryan, 11 App. Div. 2d 155,
204 N.Y.S.2d 1 (3d Dep't 1960) (affirming reindictment and conviction).
21. An automatic result of the violation of this constitutional privilege is that defendant
is protected not only from indictment based on any incriminating testimony which he
may have given, but also from use of such evidence. And the right and protection thus
accorded by the constitution may not be taken away or cut down by statute. People v.
Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 468, 189 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1959).
22. 10 N.Y.2d at 173, 176 N.E.2d at 578, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
23. 6 N.Y.2d at 224, 160 N.E.2d at 474, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 174. So too, in the Instant
case, appellant cites, as important, his confusion as to the law as conveyed by the Special
Assistant Attorney General. Brief for Appellant, pp. 29-31, People v. Laino, 10 N.Y,2d
161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961). Respondent urged that no confusion existed.
Brief for Respondent, pp. 31-32, People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961). The instant court makes no mention of this as a basis for Its
decision.
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that the statute "only confers immunity after a witness (or prospective de-
fendant) invokes his privilege .... "2 4 Judge Dye, in his concurring opinion, how-
ever, stated "that the refusal of the defendant witness to sign a general waiver of
immunity was tantamount to a claim of privilege against self incrimination..
-a theory diametrically opposed to the dissent.
Although the instant case has clarified the meaning of the statute and has
reiterated its constitutionality, the fact does remain that it is quite difficult to
distinguish between a prospective defendant and a witness before a grand
jury. A subsequent indictment seems to indicate that he was a prospective
defendant. It is true that many of the evils of automatic and complete im-
munity no longer exist; that subsequent reindictment may be had, and that
the privilege against self-incrimination may not be asserted in advance of
questions actually propounded.20 The prospective defendant really has no
need to seek protection under the statute since he is afforded immunity under
the constitutional provision against self-incrimination. However the witness'
only protection comes from the Immunity Statute, but subsequent indictment
seems to transform the witness into the role of prospective defendant. This
circuity seems to aid in the avoidance of fulfillment of the technical require-
ments of the legislation and confers a practical immunity upon all who testify.
The barren net effect of the statute is that defendant may be reindicted upon
independent evidence.
Negligence-Third Party Beneficiary Liability of Attorney to Beneficiaries
of a Will.:-Defendant attorney was engaged by testator to prepare a will in
which testator made the plaintiffs beneficiaries of a testamentary trust. De-
fendant prepared testamentary instruments creating the trust which, by virtue
of statutes relating to restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities, 1
was invalid. Plaintiffs, as a result, settled, with the blood relatives of the testa-
tor, their claims to a share of the estate for a smaller amount than they would
have received had the trust been valid. Plaintiffs brought this action to recover
the loss thus suffered from the attorney who drafted the will for the testator.
The lower court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint as failing
to state either a cause of action in negligence or a cause of action for breach
of contract. The Supreme Court of California affirmed, holding that the at-
torney's error did not constitute negligence or breach of contract.2 The court,
24. 6 N.Y.2d at 219, 160 N.E.2d at 471, 1S9 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
25. Id. at 217, 160 N.E.2d at 470, 1S9 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
26. 10 N.Y.2d at 174, 176 N.E.2d at 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
1. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1463, § 1, at 3442 (formerly Cal. Civ. Code § 715.1, dealing
with suspension of power of alienation); Cal. Civ. Code § 715.2 (dealing vth vesting
of interest in property); Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1463, § 4, at 3442 (formerly Cal. Civ.
Code § 716, dealing with vesting of future interests).
2. The rule against perpetuities had been described as a "technicality ridden legal
nightmare" and a "dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most member. of the bar."
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954). Noting
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however, expressly overruled Buckley v. Gray,8 stating that the lack of privity
between plaintiffs and defendant did not preclude plaintiffs from maintaining
an action in tort against defendant; and that intended beneficiaries of a will
may recover as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between testator and
his attorney. Lucas v. Hamm, - Cal. 2d -, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
Originally, the doctrine of privity of contract deprived third persons of a
cause of action for negligent performance of a contractual duty. 4 Gradually
exceptions to this rule appeared. In Thomas v. Winchester5 a drug manufac-
turer was held liable to a third person for mislabelling poison on the theory
that the product was inherently dangerous. The court, in rejecting privity,
reasoned that the duty of care arose from the nature of the product and the
probable consequences of dealing negligently with it. A car manufacturer in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.6 was held liable to the ultimate purchaser on
the theory that a car was a product which was imminently dangerous if negli-
gently made. Extending the Thomas rule, the court reasoned that the nature
of the product gave a warning that if it were negligently made, injury to some-
one was foreseeable.
Having opened the area of product liability,7 some courts began to speculate
in the field of verbal negligence. In Glanzer v. Shepard3 the MacPherson rule
was extended to verbal negligence and a public weigher was found liable to a
third party purchaser because of his negligence in weighing goods which he
undertook to weigh by virtue of his contract with the seller.9 In Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,10 however, the New York Court of Appeals retreated from
Glanzer and refused to hold an accountant liable for negligence to a third
person who had relied on an erroneous certificate in making a loan."' Most
these descriptions, the court decided that defendants' error did not constitute a want of
ordinary skill and competence. Also, since an attorney is not an insurer of his work, he is not
liable for mistakes he may make. Therefore the court concluded that plaintiffs' complaint did
not state a cause of action for negligence or breach of contract. - Cal. 2d -, 364 P.2d
685, 689-90 (1961).
3. 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895).
4. This rule is attributed to dictum in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), where the court stated: "The only safe rule is to confine
the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that,
there is no reason why we should not go fifty." Id. at 115, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
5. 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
6. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
7. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1960), which covers the doctrine of privity
in product liability from its beginnings to the present time, with a state by state discussion
of the status of the privity doctrine; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
8. 233 N.Y.:236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
9. Liability was based on the weigher's knowledge of the circumstances and his duty,
if he acted at all, to act carefully. Id. at 239, 135 N.E. at 276. See also International
Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927).
10. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
11. "[In the absence of fraud] the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is
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state courts have acquiesced in this decision and in the absence of fraud,
liability for verbal negligence has been limited to the parties of the contract,
to parties with a special relationship,'-' or to fields which are considered public. 3
There is nothing novel in finding an attorney liable for negligence.14 In
fact, the first negligence cases concerned the liability of persons who professed
competence in certain callings-among these, the legal profession.0 3 It has
been the universal rule, however, in this country and abroad, that an attorney,
in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation is liable only to his client. 0 This
rule was abandoned in the present case. The court completely rejected the need
for proof of privity in a verbal negligence action. 7 In overruling Buckley it
relied on the reasoning of Biakanja v. Irving,-8 which involved a fact situation
similar to the instant case except that the defendant was a notary public. In
holding the notary liable for the negligent preparation of a will, the Biahania
court itself rejected the Buckley reasoning. It had noted that the rule which
denied recovery to third persons, not in privity, had been greatly liberalized
since it made its first appearance in California law in 1895.10 The stringent
privity test having been rejected by Biakanja, legal writers once more&° con-
bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract
has been made." Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 44S.
12. International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927) (bailor-
bailee relationship).
13. Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public weigher).
14. Blaustein, Liability of Attorney to Client in New York for Negligence, 19 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 233 (1953); Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 Calif. L. Rev.
39 (1935); Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755 (1959).
15. See Wade, supra note 14, at 755.
16. The classic statement of the rule is found in Savings Bank v. Ward, 1C0 U.S. 195
(1879). "Where there is fraud or collusion, the party will be held liable, even though
there is no privity of contract; but where there is neither fraud or collusion nor privity
of contract, the party will not be held liable unless the act is one imminently dangerous
to the lives of others, or is an act performed in pursuance of some legal duty." Id. at
205-06. See Jacobsen v. Overseas TanLship Corp., 11 F.R.D. 97, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1950);
Lackey v. Vickery, 57 F. Supp. 791 (W). Mo. 1944); Kasen v. Morrell, 13 1ie. 2d 153,
183 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Dallas v. Fassnacht, 42 NI.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. CL 1943);
In re Cushman, 95 Misc. 9, 160 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Surr. Ct. 1916); Adelman v. Ro:Mbaum, 133
Pa. Super. 3M6, 3 A.2d 15 (1938); In re Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L!. 3 (Can. 1923); Robert-
son v. Fleming, 4 Macq. HL. Cas. 167, 1 Pater. 1057 (Scot. iS61).
17. "It follows that the lack of privity between plaintiffs and defendant does not
preclude plaintiffs from maintaining an action in tort against defendant." - Cal. 2d
at -, 364 P.2d at 6SS.
13. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
19. Id. at 649, 320 P.2d at 18.
20. In 1935, after the Securities Act of 1933, 4S Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-aa (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-1960) had been pased, there was some spcculation,
because of section 11 of the act, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958)
(most probably passed because of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174
N.E. 441 (1931)), that attorneys might be subjected to liability to third prsons
for negligence. See Laacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 39,
45 (1935).
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sidered the possibility of an attorney being held liable to a third party for
negligence.21
The instant court weighed the legal burden it was placing upon the attorney
against the hardship which might result when an innocent beneficiary is denied
a recovery.22 In deciding in favor of the latter and rejecting privity as an
element to be established in a verbal negligence action, the present court did
not act arbitrarily. It here proposed a test which is based on sound legal prin-
ciples, i.e., the intent of testator, foreseeability of injury, prevention of future
harm, and, ultimately, manifest justice.23
The court did not stop here. It went on to say that as a matter of policy,
beneficiaries of a will should be entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries
of the contract between the attorney and the testator.24 Notwithstanding the
court's finding that the attorney in the instant case was not liable for breach
of contract, it again clashed with the Buckley case. The court in the latter
case reasoned that the purpose of the contract was to benefit the testator,
2 1
and therefore concluded that a beneficiary of a will was merely "incidentally
or remotely benefited" 26 by the contract between the attorney and the testator.
Consequently, he was excluded from the class of third-party beneficiaries set
forth in the California statute.2 7 The instant court, on the other hand, rea-
soned that the testator's principal purpose in making the agreement was to
benefit the persons named in the will. A beneficiary named in a will was there-
fore a true third party beneficiary of the contract between the attorney and
testator.28 We have here the inevitable continuation of the trend in American
courts toward the favoring and expansion of the concept of third, party bene-
ficiaries.2 9 It is generally accepted that the liability of a promisor to a third
21. See Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 755, 759
(1959).
22. - Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 688.
23. "[Wlhether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third person
not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among
which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the
foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the
policy of preventing future harm." Id. at -, 364 P.2d at 687, citing Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
24. - Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 689.
25. The Buckley court felt that the main purpose of a testator in making his will was
to enable him to dispose of his estate in accordance with his desire. 110 Cal. at 347, 42
Pac. at 902.
26. Id. at 346, 42 Pac. at 901.
27. Cal. Civ. Code § 1559 provides: "A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a
third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind It."
28. - Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 689.
29. "The tendency of American authority is to sustain the gift in all such cases and
to permit the donee-beneficiary to recover on the contract." Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y.
233, 241, 120 N.E. 639, 642 (1918).
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party depends on the intent of the promisee.30 It is logical, therefore, to bottom
liability on the intent of the testator.3 ' However, the recognized test of this
intent is stated to be: "To whom is performance to be rendered."3 2 Applying
the test to the facts in the subject case it is not so clear that the performance
was not rendered to the testator exclusively and that the beneficiary was no
more than an incidental beneficiary. Although the stated test is not conclusive,
since the intention of the parties may turn on a great variety of facts, it does
cast some doubt on the court's conclusion that the intent of the testator is
",nmitakably" to benefit the persons named in the will.P The intention of
the parties to the contract being a question of fact gleaned from a consideration
of all the circumstances of the case,34 it does not necessarily follow that the
testator's main purpose is always to benefit the beneficiary or beneficiaries
named in his will. This rather would be a question requiring scrutiny of the
testator's agreement with his attorney. Therefore, by accepting, without in-
quiry, the contention that the intent of a testator in making his will "ob-
viously" is to benefit the persons named in the will, the court may be answering
a question of fact and thus is overstepping its appellate bounds.
Whatever be the case, the doctrine of privity has often been a source of
obvious injustice. In rejecting it as a sine qua non for verbal negligence, the
California court has given us a fairer, legally sound,35 and more logical20
standard. However true it may be in many cases that the primary intention
of the testator in making his will is to benefit the persons named therein, the
court, nonetheless, by its categorical and universal acceptance of legatees as
third party beneficiaries to the contract between the testator and his attorney,
may here be surveying too wide an area of liability.
Patents-Replacement of Single Element in a Patented Combination Is
Repair and Not Reconstruction.-Defendant manufactured, sold, and in-
stalled convertible automobile tops designed to replace the original tops of a
patented combination.' Plaintiff, who had acquired all rights to the patent, sued
30. See 4 Corbin, Contracts § 776 (1951); Simpson, Contracts § 32 (1954); 2 Williston,
Contracts § 356, 356A (3d ed. 1959).
31. - Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 6S9.
32. Simpson, Contracts § S2 (1954).
33. - Cal. 2d at -, 364 P.2d at 6M9.
34. "[Tihe right of a third person to recover upon a contract made by other parties for
his benefit must rest upon the peculiar circumstances of each case rather than upon the
law of some other case." Wright v. Glen TeL Co., 4S Misc. 192, 195, 95 N.Y. Supp. 101,
103 (Sup. Ct. 1905), aff'd, 112 App. Div. 745, 99 N.Y. Supp. 85 (3d Dep't 1903).
35. See Prosser, Torts §§ 36, S, 107 (2d ed. 1955).
36. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that zo it .as
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1097).
1. U.S. Letters Patent 2569724 granted Oct. 2, 1951, to Harry A. Maclie and Stanley
Duluk.
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for an injunction2 of the alleged infringement 3 and contributory infringement, 4
and for an accounting of profits.5 Plaintiff argued that the replacement of the
top, as relatively durable and expensive and thus the heart of the combina-
tion, was a reconstruction and hence an infringement. Defendant maintained
that there was no reconstruction but merely the replacement of a single ele-
ment, and hence a repair. The court of appeals affirmed0 the district court's
finding of the validity of the patent, its infringement and contributory in-
fringement. 7 On certiorari, the Supreme Court, three Justices dissenting, re-
versed. The replacement of a single element in a patented combination is a
permissible repair and not a reconstruction. Aro MI g. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
To maintain an action for contributory infringement a direct infringement
must be shown.8 The latter occurs when the patented article is made, used,
or sold within the United States during the term of the patent without the
authority of the patentee.9 A contributory infringement occurs when a com-
ponent is sold specially for use in an infringement of a patent and such com-
ponent is not a staple article of commerce.10 Generally, however, there can
be no infringement of a patent unless all of the elements are used," i.e.,
unless the patented article, as such and as patented, is used. Reconstruction
of a patented combination is an infringement 12 but repair of the combination
is allowable.13 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Wilson v. Simp-
son,14 held that replacement of detachable blades in a woodplaning machine
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1958) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United
States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent."
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1958) provides: "Whoever sells a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use
in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer."
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1958).
6. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200 (1st Cir. 1959).
7. Convertible Top Replacement Co. v. Aro Mfg. Co., 119 U.S.P.Q. 122 (D. Mass. 1958).
8. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Hesser, 131 F.2d 406, 410 (6th Cir.
1942); American Safety Razor Corp. v. Frings Bros. Co., 62 F.2d 416, 417 (3d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 726 (1933).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1958). The reviser's note, following this section, stated the sec-
tion to be declaratory only. Hence it left intact the entire body of case law.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1958).
11. Cimiotti Unbairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 410 (1905);
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891); Eames v. Godfrey, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
78, 79 (1863); Prouty v. Draper, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842).
12. Goodyear Shoe Mach. Co. v. Jackson, 112 Fed. 146, 148 (1st Cir. 1901).
13. Id. at 149.
14. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850) (blades were to be replaced every sixty to ninety
days).
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covered by a combination patent was a permissible repair and not a recon-
struction.15 There the Court reasoned that unless the machine was made anew
there could be no infringement 0 and implied from eamination of the machine,
that the inventor intended such a replacement.1 7 Subsequently, in Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co.,18 where a patent
covered the combination of a dispenser and a toilet paper roll, the Court
found no infringement when the rolls alone were replaced 1 9 Nor was infringe-
ment found in the replacement of gelatin bands of a patented combination
covering a duplicating machine and the gelatin bandsY0 Reconstruction, how-
ever, was found in Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,-2 where a patent covered the
combination of a metal band and buckle to form ties used to bind bales of cotton
in transit. After use the ties were severed and discarded. The defendant bought
the scrap, riveted the bands together, and resold them. The Court reasoned
that the band had been voluntarily severed; that its capacity for use volun-
tarily destroyed; that it could not be used again and, that, therefore, the de-
fendant had reconstructed it.22 In Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co.,y2 3 where a patent covered the combination of a talking machine and a
record, infringement was found when the purchaser bought more records
merely to increase his repertory of records. The Leeds & Catlin Court asserted
that there was no repair or pretence of repair, as there had been in Wilson t
and that the disc, unlike the roll of toilet paper, was the advance upon the
prior art.25 The Court reasoned that it was immaterial whether one or all of
the elements of the combination were unpatented.20
More recent decisions of federal courts of appeals have considered variant
elements as factors in the determination of whether there has been a repair or
reconstruction. 27 In the instant case, the majority ignored this approach and
15. "[R]epairing partial injuries, whether they occur from accident or from wear and
tear, is only refitting a machine for use. And it is no more than that, though it shall he
a replacement of an essential part of a combination. It is the use of the whole of that
which a purchaser buys, when the patentee sells to him a machine. .. *" Id. at 123.
16. Id. at 123-24.
17. Id. at 125-26.
1i. 152 U.S. 425 (1894).
19. Id. at 435.
20. Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 US. 100 (1923).
21. 106 U.S. S9 (18S2).
22. Id. at 94.
23. 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
24. Id. at 336.
25. Id. at 333-
26. Ibid. This was the first case to consider the "essentialness" of an element to
the combination. The Court in discussing this said, "The disc is not a mere concomitant
to the stylus; it co-acts with the stylus to produce the result .... [Ilt is the distinction
of the invention, constituting . . . the advance upon the prior artY Id. at 335.
27. E.g., Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d S0D, 804 (6th Cir. 1944)
(physical domination of replaced part relative to entire combination); El Dorado Foundry,
Mach. & Supply Co. v. Fluid Packed Pump Co., 31 F.2d 7S2, 786 (Sth Cir. 1936) (cost
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used an essentially simple test-was the article made anew? 28 The Court cited
Cotton-Tie as an example of a reconstruction" but concluded that replacement
of any single element would constitute a repair.8 0 The Court rejected the
proposition that a combination patent could have an "essential" element or a
"heart" 31 and, while it cited Leeds & Catlin,32 it did not consider that case a
repair-reconstruction case. 33
The dissent contended that reconstruction depends upon a variety of cir-
cumstances.3 4 Prior cases have shown, Mr. Justice Harlan argued, that recon-
struction can take place when the replacement is unpatented or only one ele-
ment replaced.3 5 Mr. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion accepted the
test of reconstruction as it was set forth in the dissent, 6 but found the question
of reconstruction one of law requiring an independent determination of the
facts by the appellate court.37 In his analysis of the facts, the defendant's acts
constituted no more than a repair.
Mr. Justice McKenna wrote in Leeds & Catlin: "It can make no difference
as to the infringement or non-infringement of a combination that one of its
elements or all of its elements are unpatented."38 Almost in answer, the present
Court stated, "The patent is for a combination only" and since "none of the
separate elements of the combination is claimed as the invention, none of them
when dealt with separately, is protected by the patent monopoly."30 Leeds &
Catlin may, of course, be distinguished from the instant decision as it did not
involve the issue of repair or replacement but merely an increase in the supply
of records to enhance the enjoyment of the recording machine. The old records
were not worn or broken but continued in use along with the new ones. But
Leeds & Catlin necessarily found that the disc was the heart of the combina-
tion. It would now appear that the present Court will give short shrift to
claims of reconstruction and it would appear that all that is left of the
earlier cases is Cotton-Tie. Even then, it would appear that the complete re-
of component compared to cost of entire combination); Williams v. Barnes, 234 Fed. 339,
340 (7th Cir. 1916) (life of replaced element in relation to life of whole combination);
Davis Elec. Works v. Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 Fed. 276, 282 (Ist Cir. 1894) (essential-
ness of replaced element).
28. 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Id. at 344-45.
32. Id. at 346.
33. The Court cited Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 100 (1923), Morgan
Envelope, Cotton-Tie, and Wilson as the only repair-reconstruction cases. Id. at 343 n.9.
34. Id. at 376.
35. The dissent cited Leeds & Calin to show that reconstruction can take place when
only one unpatented element is replaced. Id. at 375.
36. Id. at 362.
37. Id. at 367.
38. 213 U.S. at 333.
39. 365 U.S. 336, 340 (1961), citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320
U.S. 661, 667 (1944).
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building of a patented object which had been completely destroyed must now
be shown to establish a reconstruction.
Taxation-Embezzled Funds Within the Gross Income of the Embezzler.
-During the years 1951 through 1954, petitioner, a union official, misap-
propriated more than $73S,000 from his union and from an insurance company
with which the union was doing business. He was convicted of embezzlement
under the penal statute of New Jersey.1 Subsequently he was convicted of
wilfully attempting to evade the income tax due for each of the years 1951
through 1954.2 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction,3 holding that
embezzled funds constituted gross income to the embezzler within the meaning
of Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 4 The Supreme Court of
the United States reversed, holding that the element of wilfullness required
for a conviction under section 7201 of the Code could not be proven, since at
the time of the embezzlement, embezzled funds were excluded from gross
income. The Court, however, overruled Commissioner v. Wilcox, which had
excluded embezzled funds from the purview of gross income, thereby ex-
tending gross income to include embezzled funds and removing from future
embezzlers the tax-exempt shield which Wiko:x had afforded.0 James v.
United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
Two dominant factors appear to have been employed by the courts in
ascertaining a taxpayer's gross income: actual control over the money received
and a claim of right to the receipt. In North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet,7 the
Court announced the "claim of right" test:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction
as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even
though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even
though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.8
Applying the "claim of right" criterion to embezzled funds, the Court held
in Wilcox that embezzled funds were not gross income to the embezzler, since
"without some bona fide legal or equitable claim .. .the taxpayer cannot
1. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:102-3 (1953).
2. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201.
3. United States v. James, 273 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1959).
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a) defines gross income as "all income from whatever
source derived... Y
5. 327 US. 404 (1946).
6. The division of the Court is most interesting. Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Brennan and Stewart concurred in reversing the conviction and overruling Wilcox.
Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker concurred in reversing the conviction, but did Eo
by relying on and reaffirming Wilcox. Justice Clark was with the majority in overruling
Wilcox, but voted to affirm the conviction. While Justices Frankfurter and Harlan con-
curred in the overruling of Wilcox, they would have ordered a new trial.
7. 2S6 U.S. 417 (1932).
8. Id. at 424.
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be said to have received any gain or profit within the reach of § 22(a)."D
The legality of the means used by the taxpayer in acquiring money had never
been material for the purpose of determining gross income. 10 The 1954 Code
defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived. .... 1
It does not exclude unlawfully acquired funds. The original enactment of
1913, however, did require that funds be acquired from the operation of a
"lawful business" for net income purposes. 12 In no reenactment of this pro-
vision was the adjective "lawful" included as a qualification for determining
either gross or net income, whereas "all income from whatever source
derived," or provisions couched in similar language have been set out in
every subsequent statutory definition of gross income. The congressional
intent manifested by the consistent omission of "lawful" and by the reassertion
of the generic "from whatever source derived" was to remove from consideration
any test based upon legality or illegality of source and to extend the ambit
of gross income indiscriminately to both lawfully and unlawfully acquired
funds. Such was the construction the Court placed upon the statute in the
instant case.13
A long line of cases has held that illegally acquired monies are includable as
gross income. Accordingly, money derived from violation of the National
Prohibition Act was held taxable.14 Funds realized through usurious trans-
actions, 15 extortion, 16 fraud or misrepresentation 17 and profits realized from
mere use of embezzled funds,' 8 "kickbacks" from contractors,19 gambling
prohibited by state law,20 ransom payments 2l and numerous other unlawful
acquisitions were held to be within the scope of section 61. Until the instant
case, embezzled funds had constituted an exception 22 to the general trend of
the courts' decisions with respect to wrongfully acquired money. In none
of the cases involving wrongfully acquired funds did any court purport to say
that the illegality of the acquisitions ipso facto extended a criminal's tax
liability to include those funds. The courts presumably had been merely apply-
ing the same standard to lawful as to unlawful gains. In Wilcox, the Supreme
Court, applying the "claim of right" test, first enunciated in North Am. Oil
Consol., held that the embezzler, unlike others who acquired money by
9. 327 U.S. at 408.
10. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a).
12. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167.
13. 366 U.S. at 218.
14. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
15. Barker v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
16. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
17. Rollinger v. United States, 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953).
18. Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1942).
19. Caldwell v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 168 (1942).
20. Anderson v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 10 (1936).
21. Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 637
(1942).
22. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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means of a criminal act, did not receive the money under a bona fide claim
of right. Therefore, such money could not be included in the gross income of
the embezzlerY 3 Six years after Wilcox, the Court, in Ruthin v. United States,2 1
held that extorted money was within the gross income of the extortioner upon
the theory that extorted money was taxable when "its recipient has such
control over it that, as a practical matter, he derives readily realizable economic
value from it.' *-' While not expressly overruling Wilcox, ° Ruthin did limit
to embezzlement the "bona fide claim of right" rationale for determining the
tax liability of unlawful gains.2 7
The element of control relied upon in Rutkin is essentially equivalent to the
absence of "restriction as to its disposition" in North Am. Oil Consol. This
had been consistently used by the courts as one test to determine the ex-
tension of section 61 to law fuly acquired funds.23 However, it was not the
only test used; nor was it an exclusive test, which, if met, automatically
rendered acquisitions taxable. There is nothing inconsistent between the
"control" test and the "claim of right" test. Both a claim of right and the
"absence of restriction as to its disposition" were announced in North Am.
Oil Consol. as a single criterion to be used to decide the applicability of gross
income to any taxpayer's acquisitions. "Claim of right" and freedom from
"restrictions as to its disposition" were not proposed as alternative tests for
determining gross income, but as two aspects of the same test.
The Court in the instant case recognized that petitioner had no bona fide
claim of right to the embezzled funds,m and relying upon the control test of
Rutkin, determined that embezzled funds were within the scope of section 61.
The extortioner in Rutkin did, in fact, assert a "claim" to the extorted
money,30 and that Court did recognize a certain "assailable" claim in the
extortioner.3 ' In the instant case, the majority recognized that the embezzler
gains no claim based on title, while the extortioner may gain a voidable title,
though not recognizing this as a valid basis for distinguishing between the
extortioner and the embezzler.32
An immediate result of the instant decision is the repudiation of the bona
fide element of the "claim of right" test as applied to both lawfully and unlaw-
fully acquired funds. In the case of criminally acquired funds, there can be
no bona fide claim of right. In the case of lawfully acquired funds, the bona
23. Id at 403.
24. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
25. Id. at 137.
26. It was urged by petitioner in the instant case that Congress asquieced in the
Wilcox holding by refusing to act on a bill to change it. The majority rejected this as
inconclusive of the congressional intent.
27. 343 U.S. at 13S.
28. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ; Funal v. Commistioner, 181
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1950); Wilson v. Commissioner, 161 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1947).
29. 366 U.S. at 216.
30. Rutkin v. United States, 343 US. 130, 137 (1952).
31. Id. at 136-37.
32. 366 U.S. at 216-17.
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fide element is, as a matter of fact, met. The instant case has not abandoned
the claim of right principle of North Am. Oil Consol., but only the "bona
fide" gloss which Wilcox had given to it. The case has amplified the original
dual requirement of North Am. Oil Consol.:
When a taxpayer acquires earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual
recognition, express or implied, of an obligation to repay and without restriction
as to their disposition, "he has received income which he is required to return .... ,o
It is clear that the control element of North Am. Oil Consol. remains. The
claim of right requirement has actually been restated with greater precision
as the absence of a "consensual recognition, express or implied, of an obligation
to repay." 34 Thus has the instant decision crystallized and given greater
significance to the somewhat vague concept of claim of right. Under this
rationale, loans are not taxable because the debtor does have a consensual
recognition of an obligation to repay and consequently cannot be said to
assert any claim of right to the borrowed funds. Conversely, it follows that
the embezzler does meet the claim of right requirement, since by virtue of his
act of criminal misappropriation, he necessarily repudiates any consensual re-
cognition of an obligation to repay.-* Thus, the embezzler, like every other
criminal, asserts a claim of right by virtue of the crime, albeit not a bona
fide claim.
Trade Regulation-Sales Commission, Agreement Declared an Unfair
Method of Competition Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.-The Atlantic Refining Company entered into an agreement with the
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company by which Goodyear promised to pay a
sales commission' to Atlantic for all tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA)
bought by Atlantic's wholesale and retail dealers. 2 Evidence was presented
33. Id. at 219.
34. Ibid.
35. Under this interpretation of claim of right, it is doubtful whether the analogy
between the embezzler and the honest debtor, cited by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent, Id.
at 238-39, is valid. If claim of right now means the absence of consensual recognition of
an obligation to repay, obviously the embezzler recognizes no consensual obligation to
repay while the honest borrower does.
1. "Under the terms of the sales contracts between Goodyear and Atlantic . . .
Atlantic is entitled to a commission amounting to 10 per cent of the net sales value of
all sponsored (i.e., Goodyear . . .) merchandise sold by Atlantic retail dealers, as con-
sideration for the assistance given by the Atlantic sales organization in obtaining TBA
orders from Atlantic dealers." Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (FTC
Orders) ff 29426, at 37734 (March 23, 1961). Atlantic also had a sales commission agree-
ment with The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. with the result that Atlantic's marketing
area was divided between Goodyear and Firestone.
2. The Commission found that "motorists purchase approximately 37 per cent of
their replacement tires and tubes, 44 per cent of their replacement batteries, and 20
per cent of their automotive accessories from gasoline service stations." Id. at 37728.
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which showed that Atlantic had coerced its wholesale and retail dealers to
purchase the sponsored TBA. The hearing examiner3 held that the coercive
tactics of Atlantic coupled with an illegal tying arrangement 4 amounted to a
violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.3 The Federal
Trade Commission6 approved the findings and report of the hearing examiner,
but went further and held that the sales commission agreement in and of itself
was an unfair method of competition. The Commission therefore issued a cease
and desist order 7 prohibiting Atlantic and Goodyear from using the sales com-
mission plan for distributing TBA. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. (FTC Orders) 129426 (March 23, 1961).1
The Federal Trade Commission was established by Congress not only to curb
existing violations of the antitrust laws, but also to prevent, in their incipiency,
practices which could lead to violations.0 The Commission, as a quasi-judicial
administrative agency, is empowered to restrain violations of the Clayton Act 10
or Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."1 Under the general lan-
guage of section 5 the Commission may enjoin practices which amount to
incipient or consummate violations of the Sherman Act.'- Section 5 also enables
the Commission to "nip in the bud" practices which could develop into viola-
tions of the Clayton Act.13 In employing section 5 the Commission is bound
by the same substantive criteria as are the courts.14
3. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 64S6, FTC, Oct. 23, 1959.
4. "[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to f l one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product ... !" Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 US. 1, 5 (1953).
5. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." 3S Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (195S). The Federal Trade Commission "in the first instance, subject to the judicial
review provided, has the determination of practices which come within the scopa of the
act." FTC v. Beech-nut Packing Co., 257 US. 441, 453 (1922).
6. 3S StaL 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1953).
7. See 3S Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1953).
S. See also two companion cases: Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep.
(FTC Orders) fI 29427 (March 23, 1961) ; B. F. Goodrich Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 5 29423
(March 23, 1961). The Federal Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order in the
Firestone case, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, at 37774, but remanded the Good-
rich case for further evidence of market data. B. F. Goodrich Co., supra, at 37778.
9. "It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act ... to stop in their incipiency acts and
practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts .... ." FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.. 392, 394-95 (1953). See also FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 70S (194); FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934); FTC
v. Raladam Co., 293 U.S. 643, 647-43 (1931).
10. 3S Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (195S) (Supp, II, 1959-19G0).
11. 3S Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1953).
12. 26 Stat. 209 (1390), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1953).
13. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co, 344 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1953).
14. Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 143 (1955); see Oppenbeim, Guides to
Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act With the Sherman And
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The sales commission agreement has become in recent years a favored eco-
nomic device of the major oil companies and TBA suppliers for the distribution
of TBA products. 15 Prior to the introduction of the sales commission plan the
traditional method for distributing TBA was the purchase-resale plan. The
oil company, under this plan, would purchase TBA from various brand manu-
facturers and resell it to their service station dealers. A third, but not often
used method, allowed the service station dealers to make their own selection
and purchase of TBA from a local wholesaler or manufacturer. The control
of distribution of TBA to its service station lessees16 and contract vendees'1
offers two distinct advantages to an oil company. The first and most important
is the revenue to be gained, either through the purchase-resale or sales com-
mission plans, for the sale of TBA by service stations.' 8 The second is the
opportunity to set the standards for the quality and quantity of TBA to be
handled by the oil company's service station dealers in order to insure and
protect its name and good will. Both the purchase-resale and sales commission
plans, however, have fared poorly under the antitrust laws.
A sales commission agreement, similar to that considered in the instant case,
was before the court in Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co.1° There the plaintiff, a
Sinclair lessee dealer, brought a private suit for treble damages under Section 1
of the Sherman Act,20 alleging that Sinclair was requiring him to purchase a
substantial quantity of Goodyear TBA as an implied condition of maintaining
his lease. The court found that a tying arrangement existed which, under the
doctrine of Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,21 was unreasonable per se and
Clayton Acts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 821, 826-27 (1961). See also Grand Union Co., CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. (FTC Orders) i 28980 (Aug. 12, 1960), where the Commission brought the
action under section 5 for a practice which violated the spirit but not the letter of
§ 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(f) (1958). The Federal Trade Commission in the instant case has also enjoined
practices under § 5 which did not come within the specific provisions of the Sherman
or Clayton Acts. The Commission's attempt to enlarge § 5 as a "catch all" has been severely
criticized. Oppenheim, supra, at 836-37 n.51; Handler, 16 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 401-08
(1961); Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 657 (1961).
15. For a list of oil companies which had similar sales commission agreements with
Goodyear see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (FTC Orders) U 29426
at 37726 n.1 (March 23, 1961).
16. Lessee dealers do not own their business properties but lease them from Atlantic.
Atlantic had 2,493 lessee dealers with lease terms running from three months to three
years. Id. at 37735-36.
17. Contract dealers either own their own stations or lease them from parties other
than Atlantic. Atlantic had 3,044 contract dealers who in return for equipment agreed to
purchase specified quantities of gas, oil, and other automotive lubricants. Id. at 37737.
18. For 1955, the last full year for which figures are available, Goodyear and Firestone
paid sales commissions to Atlantic amounting to $11,263,057. Id. at 37733.
19. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
20. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
21. 356 U.S. 1 (1958). In Northern Pacific the Supreme Court declared tying arrange-
ments unreasonable per se and therefore illegal under the Sherman Act "whenever a party
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain
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therefore a violation of the Sherman Act. The Osborn court, however, did not
pass on the legality of the sales commission plan in itself. Only the tying ar-
rangement, existing as an adjunct of the sales commission agreement, was
declared illegal per se.2
2
In the present case the Commission considered the principal issue to be the
legality of the sales commission agreement, even though violations could have
been upheld on grounds of coercion or illegal tying arrangements under the rea-
soning of Northern Pacific23 and Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co.2 4 The Commission
found that Atlantic had sufficient economic power to affect a substantial amount
of commerce, and that there had been substantial anticompetitive effects on
the manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels in the TBA market as a result
of the sales commission agreement between Atlantic and Goodyear.25 The free
choice of Atlantic dealers to select and buy their own TBA was found to have
been stifled because of the economic control Atlantic exercised over its lessee
and contract dealers. Competing TBA suppliers on the other hand were fore-
closed from a substantial market through the allocation of Atlantic dealers to
specific Goodyear dealers known as "supply points."20 This foreclosure of
markets was what the Commission deemed to be "a more fundamental restraint
of trade inherent in the sales commission system itself.' 2T
Atlantic contended that if the sales commission plan were declared illegal,
its only alternative would be to resume the purchase-resale plan,- s with the
result that it too might violate the antitrust laws. The Commission, however,
brushed aside this argument stating:
[W]hat course of action Atlantic may follow with respect to TBA if the sales
commission plan is outlawed is entirely speculative .... Abolition of the sales
commission system will at least terminate the unjust advantage presently enjoyed
free competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantl' amount of
interstate commerce is affected.' Id. at 6.
22. 2S6 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960). In referring to the tie-in feature of the sale com-
mission agreement the court stated: "The perniciousness of the impozcd tie-in is ag-
gravated by the fact that the defendant is not even in the business of selling the tied pro-
ducts, but is employing its economic power in the gasoline industry to force his dealers
to do business with a supplier in another industry under an arrangement that yields the
defendant an extraneous revenue. The defendant in this case goes a step further than the
supplier in the usual tie-in case, for here the tied product is not even handled or -old
by the defendant, but it farms out to another, for a price, its coercive economic power.'
Id. at 239-40.
23. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
24. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960).
25. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (FTC Orders) 29426, at 37751
(March 23, 1961).
26. Id. at 37746-47.
27. Id. at 37741.
23. Counsel supporting the complaint sought to enjoin Atlantic from distributing TBA
to its dealers in any manner including the purchase-resale plan, but the Commilon re-
fused to go that far. Id. at 37752.
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by distributors of Firestone and Goodyear over local competitors representing other
tire manufacturers and TBA suppliers.29
Prior to the instant decision, the purchase-resale plan, like the sales commission
plan, was a permissible form of distributing TBA. In United States v. Sun Oil
Co.30 the government sought to enjoin Sunoco from using the purchase-resale
plan for distributing TBA to its service station dealers, but the agreements
between defendant and its dealers did not expressly provide for purchase of
TBA sponsored by defendant. The court, however, found the existence of oral
or tacit agreements to purchase only sponsored TBA and that "the sale of TBA
not sponsored by Sun has been substantially eliminated from over 6,500 inde-
pendent dealer service stations selling Sunoco gasoline." 3' 1 On the basis of these
facts the court declared the purchase-resale plan of Sunoco a violation of Sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act32 and enjoined defendant from pressuring its service
station dealers to purchase sponsored TBA. The purchase-resale plan in and
of itself was not declared illegal, but only that purchase-resale plan involving
supplemental oral and tacit agreements to purchase sponsored TBA.
Under the "rule of reason test,"33 whether the sales commission plan is an
unfair method of competition requires an evaluation of its competitive effects.
The Commission has stated that it considers the sales commission plan to be
productive of anticompetitive effects "even without the use of overt coercive
tactics or of written or oral tying arrangements." 3 4 The question which the
Commission has failed to ask is whether the "foreclosure of markets" in the
TBA industry with its concomitant anticompetitive effects is a direct result of
the sales commission plan in and of itself. The sales commission plan, like the
purchase-resale plan in the Sun Oil Co. case,35 does not on its face contemplate
anticompetitive effects, but rather they are the result of coercion and supple-
mental tying arrangements. The competitive effects on which the Commission
based the illegality of the sales commission plan, therefore, are a result of the
very elements which the Commission contends are not necessary to its decision.
On the contrary, it would appear that the sales commission plan for the mar-
keting of TBA stands in the same light as the purchase-resale plan, and its
legality should depend, therefore, on whether there is evidence of coercion or
supplemental oral or tacit tying arrangements between defendant oil company
and its service station dealers.
29. Id. at 37751-52.
30. 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
31. Id. at 727.
32. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
33. The rule of reason test requires that proof of substantial anticompetitive effects
be shown before a practice will be termed an unreasonable restraint of trade or an unfair
method of competition in violation of the antitrust laws. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also for a discussion of the rule of reason, Handler,
Antitrust in Perspective 3-28 (1957) ; Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 5-12 (1955).
34. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., CCH Trade Reg. Rep. (FTC Orders) II 29426, at 37751
(March 23, 1961).
35. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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Both the courts and the Federal Trade Commission have taken a dim view
of the oil companies' efforts to use their economic power in one market to
obtain extraneous revenue in another market. No matter how "pernicious" a
particular method of distributing TBA is considered to be, however, it should
not be held to be an "unfair method of competition"20 without establishing
that it has caused the anticompetitive effects. Up to the present time the pur-
chase-resale plan and the sales commission plan were illegal only upon a show-
ing of coercion or supplemental tying arrangements between the oil company
and its service station dealers. If the reasoning of the Commission in the
instant case is upheld upon judicial review, the question then arises whether
the Atlantic Refining Company may resume the purchase-resale plan without
coming in conflict with the antitrust laws.
Under the Commission's reasoning it appears that the purchase-resale plan
will fare no better than the sales commission plan. Upon a finding of anti-
competitive effects due to the purchase-resale plan the Commission could
declare it an unfair method of competition, in and of itself, without resort to
evidence of coercion or supplemental tying arrangements. The logic of the
present case could well foreclose the oil companies in the future from engaging
in any way in the distribution of TBA to their service station dealers. Its
effect at the present moment is to create more confusion in a field where pre-
dictability has long been desired.
Workmen's Compensation-Heart Attack Caused by Employment-Con-
nected Anxiety and Worry Alone Compensable as Accidental Injury.-
Decedent was employed to supervise the maintenance of defendant employer's
airplanes. One of the planes under his charge developed wing corrosion and was
subsequently grounded by the CAA. The employer blamed the decedent person-
ally for the damage and gave him an ultimatum to have it repaired within a
specified brief period of time. The plane was not only not repaired in time but
the decedent also became involved in protracted negotiations over the exceed-
ingly high repair bill. It was alleged that the resulting anxiety and worry which
the decedent suffered caused the myocardial infarction' from which he died three
days later. An award of death benefits to decedent's widow by the Workman's
Compensation Board was reversed by the appellate division. The court found
substantial medical testimony connecting decedent's heart attack to the emo-
tional stress of his work, but held that in the absence of a showing of any phys-
36. FTC v. Gratz, 233 U.S. 421, 427-23 (1920).
1. There is a profound physiological effect of emotion on the heart and cardioascuLar
system. "Heavy work and physical exertion may endanger the heart, but worry, tension,
pressure and emotional strain in association with such work may caue much purater
damage." 5 Lawyers' Aledical Cyclopedia 155-56 (1960). See also MacIver, Psychiatric
Aspects of Cardiovascular Disease in Industry, in The Heart in Industry 317-1s, 326-31
(Hoeber ed. 1960); Texon, Causal Relationships in Heart Diseases in Workmen's Com-
pensation Cases, in Work and the Heart 426, at 427, 431 (Hoeber ed. 1959).
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ical strain, his injury was not compensable. 2 The court of appeals, in a four to
three decision, 3 reversed the appellate division and reinstated the award, holding
that a heart attack, caused by employment-connected anxiety and worry alone,
constituted an accidental injury justifying a compensation award. Klinas v.
Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 176 N.E.2d
714 (1961).
The history of compensation cases in New York State shows three basic
prerequisites for an award: 1. The occurrence of an accident or contraction of
a disease; 2. in the course of employment; 3. some causal relationship between
work and the accident or disease. "These deceptively simple requirements be-
wail their responsibility for countless controversies, mountains (the Everest
size) of testimony, and immeasureable swamps of administrative and judicial
opinions."14
The problem in the instant case involves an interpretation of the first require-
ment, i.e., what is an "accidental injury" within the meaning of the Workman's
Compensation Law?5 In a heart case, a distinction is to be made between an
accident and a disease, the latter being non-compensable,0 since only those
"diseases" specifically listed as "occupational diseases" are compensable. A
heart disease is not classified as an occupational disease. New York first notably
touched on the problem in Lerner v. Rump Bros.1 According to the Lerner rule,
in order to fall within the "accidental" category and thus be compensable, the
heart attack must be caused by a single and unexpected act.8
The Lerner rule was closely followed by the court of appeals in heart attack
cases up through the late 1930's.P But, in the early 1940's the rule was "ob-
2. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72
(3d Dep't 1960).
3. Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Fuld and Van Voorhis dissenting.
4. Levitan, The Liability Phase of the Cardiac Problem, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 347, 348
(1958).
5. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 2(7) defines "injury" as meaning only "accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as
may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom."
6. 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 135 (1959).
7. 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925). The court said, "First, the inception of the
disease must be assignable to a determinate or single act, identified in space or time ...
Secondly, it must also be assignable to something catastrophic or extraordinary." Id.
at 155, 149 N.E. at 335.
8. 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.64(a) at 548 (1952); Dittmar, Workmen's
Compensation 21 (1950).
9. See, e.g., Frankel v. National 5, 10 and 25 Cent Stores, 243 App. Div. 841, 278
N.Y. Supp. 450 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 509, 198 N.E.
378 (1935) where a truckdriver sustained a heart attack lifting and moving merchandise,
a normal activity of his job, and was denied compensation on the basis that such a cause
was not extraordinary; Green v. Geiger, 255 App. Div. 903, 7 N.Y.S.2d 762 (3d Dep't
1938) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 610, 20 N.E.2d 559 (1939);
La Fountain v. La Fountain, 259 App. Div. 1095, 21 N.Y.S.2d 193 (3d Dep't), afl'd mem,,
284 N.Y. 725, 31 N.E.2d 199 (1940), where a blacksmith suffered a heart attack while
shoeing a horse and was denied compensation since the activity causing the attack was
not extraordinary.
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served in the letter, if not in the spirit, through findings of extraordinary...
events, even though such events, while 'determinate or single' acts are indis-
tinguishable from the ordinary and expected situations which comprise the
employment."' 0 In reality, the courts no longer held that the cause had to be
an unexpected one.'
In Ruby v. L stig,12 the court sustained an award to a painter who had placed
his ladder so that he had to stretch his arm all the way out in order to paint.
The court held that "extreme exertion and extension of his arms in painting"
satisfied the requirement of "accidental injury," relying on the "unexpected
result" of the single act causing the heart attack rather than the single act it-
self as the unexpected cause. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the courts
continued to look more toward the unexpected result and further liberalized the
rule relating to the "single act" requirement by awarding compensation for
heart attacks caused by physical overexertion over a period of time.13 The
physical overexertion required by the regular job activity, however, had to en-
tail greater exertion than the ordinary wear and tear of life in order to satisfy
the standard of "accidental injury."' 4
10. Meriam & Thornton, "Accidental Injury" in the Court of Appeals: The Meta-
morphosis of a Rule of Law, 16 Brooklyn L. Rev. 203, 203 (1950).
11. Godsman v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp., 263 App. Div. 945, 51 N.Y.S.2d 363 (3d
Dep't 1944) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 295 N.Y. 703, 65 N.E.2d 339 (1946), whcre a
fireman suffered a heart attack after he ran up two fligbts of stairs, came halfway down, and
then went back up in answer to a fire call. Although the act was obvioucly routine for the
fireman, he was awarded compensation; McCormack v. Wood Harmon Warranty Corp.,
263 App. Div. 914, 32 N.Y.S.2d 145 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 28S
N.Y. 614, 42 N.E.2d 613 (1942); Bohm v. L.RS. & B. Realty Co., 264 App. Div. 952, 37
N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d Dep't 1942) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 2S9 N.Y. E03, 47 N.E2d
52 (1943); Cooper v. Brunswick Cigar Co., 273 App. Div. 1033, 79 N.Y.S.2d E67 (3d Dep't)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 731, 83 N.E.2d 142 (1943); Brools v. Elliott
Bates, Inc., 269 App. Div. 792, 55 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1945) (memorandum dccison),
aff'd mem, 295 N.Y. 710, 65 N.E.2d 340 (1946).
12. 274 App. Div. 954, 33 N.YS.2d 665 (3d Dep't 1943) (memorandum decision),
aff'd mem., 299 N.Y. 759, 37 N.E.2d 672 (1949).
13. See, e.g., Furtardo v. American Export Airlines, Inc., 274 App. Div. 954, 83
N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision), motion for leave to appml denied, 293
N.Y. 933 (194S) (cited in the majority opinion of Klimas), where the appellate division
affirmed an award of compensation for a heart attack which the claimant had suffered at
home resulting from longer hours and harder work during a preccding shix month period;
Carlin v. Colgate Aircraft Corp., 276 App. Div. SSI, 93 N.YS2d 791 (3d Dep't 1949)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y. 754, 95 N.E.2d 626 (1950); Masse v.
James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N.E.2d 56 (1950) (reversing a denial of com-
pensation by one appellate division which had relied on Lerner); Fisher v. Buffalo Elec.
Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 612, 151 N.Y.S.2d 959 (3d Dep't 1956) (memorandum decision).
14. Mlasse v. James H. Robinson Co., supra note 13; Burris v. Lewis, 2 N.Y.2d 323,
141 N.E.2d 424, 160 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1957); Mathiez v. Meyer, 6 App. Div. 2d 741, 174
N.Y.S.2d 452 (3d Dep't) (memorandum decision), motion for leave to appeal denied,
5 N.Y.2d 705 (1958); Cuvelier v. Fairbanks & Walvoord, 6 App. Div. 2d 9:0, 175 N.Y.S2d
677 (3d Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision). Larson sums up the history of the un-
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Later cases upheld awards where the heart attack was caused by physical
overexertion coupled with mental strain and anxiety over a relatively long period
of time.15 The leading case was Lesnick v. National Carloading Corp.,'0 which
held that a compensation award could not be made for the death of a business
executive caused by a heart attack allegedly brought on by the increased pres-
sure and strain of an unusually heavy work schedule. The Lesnick court dis-
engaged itself from obvious conflict with previous decisions by noting that in
those cases the employees were actively engaged in the employment activity
which caused the strain; while, in the case before it, there was no evidence of
any physical overexertion or emotional strain at the time of the occurrence of
the heart attack.17
The majority opinion in the instant case conceded that Lesnick was "super-
ficially similar"' 8 but distinguished that case on the ground that there was no
incident of physical overexertion or mental strain and that the medical proof
was uncertain and inconclusive. The court emphasized that even though the
decedent in the present case was sitting by a swimming pool at the time of his
attack, he was still in the midst of the very problem, the strain and tension
which the board found caused his death. The dissent, however, underscored
the reasoning of Lesnick "that a heart attack found to have resulted from the
expected and single act requirement of the Lerner rule in regard to heart attacks resulting
from physical cause: "New York, beginning with an emphatic requirement of unusual and
even catastrophic cause, has . .. reached a point where, in effect, any heart attack con-
tributed to by the employment seems to be held accidental." 1 Larson, Workmen's Com-
pensation § 38.64 at 547; see Gioia v. Courtmel Co., 283 App. Div. 40, 126 N.Y.S.2d 94
(3d Dep't 1953).
15. Anderson v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 275 App. Div. 1010, 91 N.Y.S.2d 710
(3d Dep't 1949) (memorandum decision) (also cited by the majority in Klimas), where
the claimant had worked long hours and was subject to continued anxiety and excessive
mental strain at work under trying circumstances for a period approximately eighteen
months before the attack. A similar case is Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736 (1937).
16. 285 App. Div. 649, 140 N.Y.S.2d 907 (3d Dep't 1955), aff'd mem., 309 N.Y. 958,
132 N.E.2d 326 (1956). The claimant's duties, while travelling for the firm, entailed enter-
taining customers at the race track where he suffered the attack. The appellate division
held that the illness shown in the record was not accidental because no eventful happening
could be demonstrated to have caused it and its only connection with the work was a
gradual physical deterioration over a period of time. Citing the old Lerner rule, the
court said, "To affirm this award we must be ready to hold that if a man increases the
tension of the administrative work and later suffers a heart attack while at rest, this is
a compensable accident. We are not ready to go that far in the case before us." 285
App. Div. at 652, 140 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
17. The dissent challenged this distinction as trivial on the basis of the following dicta
in Masse: "Whether a particular event was an industrial accident is to be determined, not
by any legal definition, but by the common-sense viewpoint of the average man." 301
N.Y. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57.
18. 10 N.Y.2d at 215, 176 N.E.2d at 717, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
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mental stresses and worries of a job could not be regarded as an industrial
accident."' 9
Schechter v. State Ins. Fund0 presents the law in its latest stage before the
present decision. In that case, the court of appeals, with tW~o judges dissenting,
reinstated an award of compensation for a heart attack caused by a combination
of both mental strain and physical overexertion over a seven week period of
time. The court made only passing mention of Lcsnick and stated:
The phrase, "unusual or excessive strain" . . .is not so limited in its meaning as to
include only work of an entirely different character from that customarily done.
Simply stated, so long as the conditions of performing the work are such that an
exceptional strain is imposed on the worker so great that his heart is affected and
damaged thereby, the requirement of unusual or excessive strain is satisfied.2 '
Schechter was the first decision to award compensation for gradual physical
overexertion and mental strain inherent in a professional worker's activities. It
reduced the effectiveness of the Lerner rule not only with regard to awards for
heart attacks caused by physical exertion alone, but also in respect to those
caused by a combination of both physical exertion and mental strain.
Cases involving claims for compensation for heart attacks sustained through
mental causes alone fall into two categories: 1) those involving sudden fright
or shock due to some extraordinary event, and thus in keeping with the require-
ments of the Lerner rule; and 2) those due to mental strain-worry and anxiety
over a period of time-as in the instant case. It is a well accepted fact that re-
covery can be had for claims falling within the first category.22 Yet, New York
decisions involving the second category have consistently denied recoveryea in
19. Id. at 216, 176 N.E.2d at 71S, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 19. Five appellate division cases, all
dealing with purely mental causation, have relied on the Lesnick reasoning in denying
awards. Tillander v. Latin Quarter Cafe, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 590, 139 N.Y.S.2d 2,39
(3d Dep't 1959) (memorandum decision); Chernin v. Progrecs Serv. Co, 9 App. Div. 2d
170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dep't 1959) (no heart attack but rather purely mental injury),
where the court said, "We find nothing in the law that connotes purely exce"-Ave emotions-
anger, grief or other mental feelings-unaccompanied by physical force or exertion can be
the basis of an accident." Id. at 172, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 760; Stang v. J. Peckman & Co., 7
App. Div. 2d 245, 181 N.Y.S.2d 952 (3d Dep't 1959); Ehre al v. N.Y. State Div. of Employ-
ment, 2 App. Div. 2d 944, 156 N.Y.S.2d 472 (3d Dep't 1956) (memorandum deci.-ion);
O'Rourke v. State Ins. Fund, 2 App. Div. 2d 616, 151 N.Y.S.2d 756 (3d Dep't 1956)
(memorandum decision). Yet a close reading of the facts and the board's hearing in
the Lesnick case will reveal that the claimant's heart attack was caused by a combination
of both physical exertion and mental strain. Thus the basis of thee decisions, and what
the dissent in Klimas calls "holding" in the Lesnick case, in reference to purely mental
stress (anxiety and worry), is really only dicta.
20. 6 N.Y.2d 5C6, 160 N.E.2d 901, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1959). Claimant, a lawyer,
suffered a myocardial infarction allegedly caused by the increased physical exertion of
carrying a 25 to 35 pound briefcase all day, and more important, by the increased emotional
and mental strain connected with continued trial work.
21. Id. at 510, 160 N.E.2d at 904, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
22. Annot., 109 A.L.R. 887 (1937).
23. See cases cited in note 19 supra; O'Connell v. Adirondack Elec. Power Corp., 193
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an attempt to draw the line on the gradual liberalization of compensation law,
particularly evident in heart cases.24 In upholding the present claim, the court,
faced with the decision of the appellate division,2 the dicta of Lesnick, and the
lack of any cases in New York favoring the claimant in this matter, based its
decision on the already well accepted kractice of granting awards in the shock
and fright cases of the first category, 26 and on the "common sense viewpoint"
of Masse v. James H. Robinson Co.
27
The instant decision is a logical extension of the trend making heart attacks
suffered in the course of employment compensable. It is established that a heart
attack attributable to unexpected, and non-physical causes, as in the case of
shock or fright, constitutes an "accidental injury."2 8 Heart failure due to phys-
ical strain has been held to be "accidental," where either the cause or the result
was unexpected.29 Furthermore, a heart attack brought on by both physical and
mental strain over a period of time is compensable.80 Where the evidence is
sufficient to establish that heart failure has resulted from employment-connec-
ted mental strain alone, certainly "common sense" would dictate that the injury
is compensable under the Workman's Compensation Act.
App. Div. 582, 185 N.Y. Supp. 455 (3d Dep't 1920) (cited by the dissent in Kltmas)
where the court denied compensation and held: "Clearly, a man has not sustained an
injury whose mind has been made abnormally active or whose nerves have been more
than ordinarily excited." Id. at 584, 185 N.Y. Supp. at 456.
24. Deyo v. Village of Piermont, Inc., 283 App. Div. 67, 126 N.Y.S.2d 523 (3d Dep't
1953).
25. See cases cited in note 19 supra.
26. Wachsstock v. Skyview Transp. Co., 279 App. Div. 831, 109 N.Y.S.2d 206 (3d Dep't
1952) (memorandum decision) where a cab driver suffered fright causing myocardial In-
farction as a result of his efforts to swerve his cab to avoid an accident with an oncoming
car. See also Wiltcher v. National Transp. Co., 283 App. Div. 977, 130 N.Y.S.2d 586
(3d Dep't 1954) (memorandum decision); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731,
103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (3d Dep't 1951) (memorandum decision) where a witness to a fist fight
between two fellow employees suffered such emotional upset and shock as to cause
heart failure; Church v. County of Westchester, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d
Dep't 1938) (memorandum decision); Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218 App, Div.
451, 218 N.Y. Supp. 355 (3d Dep't 1926); Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745,
212 N.Y. Supp. 899 (3d Dep't 1925) (memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 242 N.Y.
577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926).
27. 301 N.Y. 34, 37, 92 N.E.2d 56-57 (1950).
28. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
29. Cases cited note 14 supra.
30. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
